THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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SIGNS OF THE TIMES

URCH STATISTICS AND CHRISTIAN PROGRESS.

The latest statistics of the Church of England issued in the *ficial Year Book* (1931), are ecclesiastically depressing. In- nt Baptisms have declined from 433,435 to 417,213 : Adult ptisms have declined from 10,578 to 10,045 : Confirmations m 200,838 to 191,677 : Easter Communicants from 2,475,846 2,443,887. The figures suggest a falling off in pastoral effi- ncy. Church services and church meetings occupy more of the ne and energy of the modern clergyman, and pastoral visitation s than used to be the case. On the other hand, it must be nembered that the clergy are fewer and older and that the ty have many more temptations to neglect public worship than merly. Not above ten per cent. of the population appear to ep any close connection with the National Church, although ssibly 70 *per cent.* would claim her membership in preference that of any other religious body.

Our ordinands in 1930 were 503, whereas they were but 439 1929. This is cheering, for it is on the personality, education, d numbers of our ordinands that the future of the Church pends. What is surprising is the very small amount of money ich the Church is giving officially to help in their training. dividual Churchmen, as, for instance, the supporters of the onsors' Scheme, are giving much. We are convinced, how- er, that lack of financial resources to complete their training ses the Church to lose a number of promising ordinands.

Whether our ordinands to-day are better or worse than the pre-war ordinands is hard to decide. There is a feeling that the personal standard is rising, and we can only hope that this is the case. We would venture to remark that if the present be not an easy age for the layman to hold fast his faith, it is an even less easy age for the young clergyman. As the new Christian apologetic becomes clearer and stronger, as the repellent *impedimenta* of an effete traditionalism are decisively discarded, so will the Christian Faith once again grip the intellectual outlook of our nation. Should it fail to purge itself that Faith will have but a feeble moral and spiritual influence in the future. The progressive element in our Church is at present engaged in a strenuous struggle on two fronts. It is opposed by a powerful secularism on the one front and by the forces of religious superstition on the other—an agglomeration of Catholic obscurantists and Protestant fundamentalists. If the forces of Reason and Religion are to prevail against those of Secularism and Superstition, more energy must be devoted to the right kind of religious education. In this connection it is cheering to note an increase in the number of study-circles and Bible classes.

Another cheering aspect of the latest statistics is the increase in the amount of the Church's voluntary offerings. These reached nearly ten million pounds, over four millions of this being for general purposes. Here perhaps we may feel we have a surer test of the influence of our religion than in the statistics of Church rites. It is of interest to note that the collection on Metropolitan Hospital Sunday in 1929 in all places of worship amounted to £34,659. Of this sum £24,231 was contributed by the National Church. The Jews came next highest with £2,296: the Roman Catholics contributed £1,023: the Wesleyans £1,126 and the Congregationalists £1,506. On this showing, if not on the basis of its Electoral Rolls, the Church of England justifies its claim to be the National Church.

Ecclesiastical statistics are deceptive and dangerous things if taken too seriously. It is in the elimination of criminality, the humanizing of morals and manners, the quality of our literature and art, and in the general well-being of our people that we shall find the best indication of the influence of Christ's Religion. The problem for our civilization to-day is not whether we have

ough in the way of material goods to go round, or enough ecie to go round, but whether we have enough morality to go und. There are many indications of a self-indulgence and ckness in our midst which would have shocked the rigour and gour of the Victorians. On the other hand there does seem to an increase in humanitarianism and sweet reasonableness.

WISH LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS.

The *Jewish Chronicle* of 2nd January publishes a vigorous ticism of the Liberal Judaism of Dr. Montefiore as presented his recent paper in the *Modern Churchman*. His critic writes :

> In the first place I would observe that Dr. Montefiore claims to base the particular Jewish belief for which he stands, entirely upon negatives. One has to abjure this and to cast off that; this has to be deemed obsolete; that antiquated, worn out or unsuitable—and so it runs throughout the article. Now the question arises, how is it possible to build up a system of belief on unbelief, a scheme of faith entirely on un-faith? It is quite true that Dr. Montefiore leaves something—for belief and for faith. Some will say, perhaps, too much—and the criticism would have much force. For as soon as you find yourself allowed, if not encouraged, to lop off this ordinance and cast aside that observance, there is the implied permission if not actual urging, to do likewise with whatever may seem suitable to you. There is nothing in Dr. Montefiore's article to show the would-be 'Liberal' Jew the point at which 'thus far and no further' must be heeded by him. It is not a matter of refusing the authority which Orthodoxy clings to, however nominally in this or that instance. He seems to claim for 'Liberal' Judaism that it shall be unshackled by any authority whatsoever, save perhaps the vague and shadowy restraint of that singularly nebulous thing known as personal conscience. How, out of such chaotic fluidity, any permanent Faith is to be built up Dr. Montefiore does not explain —indeed, he admits that even already there are ominous signs of the futility of the doctrine called 'Liberal' or Reform Judaism.

ese are the kind of arguments that Christian traditionalists e against Christian Modernists, and they will no doubt seem futile to Dr. Montefiore as they do to us.

The second criticism put forth is due to his attitude towards onism. He is an anti-Zionist because he believes that Judaism most truly realized in becoming a universal religious brotherod rather than a self-conscious Jewish State. Spread as daism is through Europe, America, Africa, and the Near and ddle East in great and growing communities, there seem to manifest advantages in the policy advocated by Dr. Montee. One of the many evils promoted by the late war is the

growth of an intense, exclusive, self-regarding nationalist con sciousness which must render the promotion of internationa peace increasingly difficult.

In another section of the same issue of the *Jewish Chronicl* under the heading 'The Failure of Liberal Judaism,' the write cites the things which according to Dr. Louis Newman th Liberal Jewish Movement has to its credit:

> It has abbreviated and improved the liturgy. It has given wome religious freedom within the Synagogue as well as within the hom It has emphasized the liberal and prophetic spirit of Judaism. It ha made the Synagogue a force for social betterment and a highly influen tial factor in the intellectual progress of the Community.

This is a noble record. To this we may add the influence whic it has had in compelling those who are hostile to the Libera Jewish Movement to adopt its reforms without adopting i name.

On the other hand, it is charged with having broken down a appreciation of Jewish ceremonial; it has decreased interest i attendance at the Synagogue; it has fanatically opposed Jewis orthodoxy and conservatism; it has reduced the loyalty of th Jew to Judaism. The writer says:

> 'It may have raised a generation of fine people, but they ha proved themselves to be poor Jews.'
>
> 'It has whittled down Jewish loyalty until many Synagogues a little less than vestibules of the Church.'

This seems to indicate that the stress on personal and soci righteousness and on the universality of the religion of Jehov which is characteristic of Israel's great prophets has been r covered by Liberal Judaism, but not, we hope, to be rejected second time by the ancient people of God.

The Hindu Invasion of U.S.A.

While Christian missions in India are securing multitudes adherents so that the Christians are now the third largest re gious body in that country, Hinduism is powerfully influenci American religious thought and practice. How many-sided t influence is may be seen recorded in a recent volume, *Hindui Invades America*,* by Dr. Wendell Thomas.

* Published by The Beacon Press, 318 West 39th Street, New York C (1929), price three dollars.

Dr. Fosdick, in his introduction, writes :

> 'There can no longer be a sharp distinction between the so-called home and foreign fields in religion. Christianity is at work in India, and Hinduism is at work in the United States. There is no possibility of Indian religion escaping the influence of Jesus Christ, and there is no possibility of America escaping the influence of the great Indian faiths.'

ıe first, as he was the greatest of Hindu missionaries to nerica, was Vivekananda, the disciple of the Hindu saint, ımakrishna, who in the nineteenth century created a Hindu vival in India. Vivekananda attended the Chicago Congress Religions in 1893 and founded the Vedanta Society in nerica in 1894. His movement combined a revival of primi- e Hinduism with a sincere reverence for Christ. Yet while realized that India needed Christ to quicken her civilization, ; ardent nationalism prevented him from surrendering to Chris- nity fundamental Hindu doctrines. A striking and attrac- e personality, a fluent English orator, he was immensely pular with many cultured Americans. His movement was in- enced by its environment, and we see in it an interesting com- ıation—'The Christian spirit and American methods grafted to a Hindu stock.' Dr. Wendell Thomas thus describes it :

> 'American Vedantism is a tree of which the seed was Vivekananda. The seed was planted in American soil by the Parliament of Religions, and the sprouting plant cultivated by wealthy Americans, especially women of leisure, as in the case of many other cults . . . This Hindu mission . . . is now supported by the field in which it operates' (p. 102).

induism also operates widely in America in the form of *ɔgoda*. *Yoga* means harmony or equilibrium, and *Yogoda* eans that which gives harmony or equilibrium to the indi- lual. This desirable result is achieved by focussing attention various parts of the body. The will can thus infuse them with e healthful energy which it draws from the cosmic source of pply. *Yogoda* is very varied in its methods and lies at the root many American cults, especially Christian Science. In some ses the Yogodans are orthodox Christians, in other cases pure ɔgodans, in other cases spiritual pilgrims who have wandered rough the borderland cults such as Theosophy, Christian ience, and New Thought. The difference between the reli-

gious tendencies in America of Vedanta and Yogoda is thus summarized by Dr. Wendell Thomas:

> 'Vedanta harks back to conservative Hinduism, while Yogoda leans forward to liberal Christianity' (p. 176).

The tendency of Hindu religious influence in U.S.A. is to weaken traditionalist Christian dualism, and therein modern science has operated in the same direction. But whereas the tendency of modern science has been to eliminate God from the universe, the Hindu tendency has been to identify the universe with God.

Reunion in the Home Field.

Some months ago the Bishop of St. Edmundsbury and Ipswich published in his *Diocesan Magazine* a cogent and helpful statement on marriage problems. In the January issue of the same organ he has recorded his reflections on the problem of home-reunion. These also we are glad to republish. He writes:

> After all, union with the Orthodox and other Eastern Churches if it were accomplished would have very little practical result. It might even conceivably make union with the Free Churches more difficult. And it is the reunion with these at home that is of real significance to English Churchmen, in comparison with which reunion with the rest of Christendom is in my judgment of much less importance.
>
> But then we come at once upon the outstanding obstacle. A large section of English Churchmen regard the apostolic succession in the commonly received acceptance of that term as essential to a true Church and to valid sacraments. To them an episcopally ordained ministry with perpetual succession by the laying on of hands was ordained by Christ Himself, and there can be no Church as he designed it that does not possess these characteristics. Another section of us (and I have never made any secret of my own convictions) think that entirely mistaken. We accept the historic episcopate as possessing valuable elements of order, elements that have approved themselves through the ages; but it seems to us not only the case that there is no evidence that Christ ordained this, but that all the evidence points the other way. Indeed, a Church so organized as an essential vehicle for the ordinary communication of the life of His Spirit seems to us incongruous with His teaching and to savour rather of the Judaic system from which He desired to set His people free; and it appears to us the more remarkable that it should be insisted upon when He Himself gave as the one test of validity, a quite different and characteristic mark, 'By their fruits ye shall know them.' By this test Presbyterianism, Congregationalism, Methodism, and the Baptist Communion stand as firmly as episcopacy. The divergence of belief on a matter so vital must, as it seems to me, prevent any real reunion until it is resolved for us all, one way or the other.

That might almost read like a note of despair in respect of reunion ever being an accomplished fact, and I confess I do not think it will come about by the acceptance of one type of organization or government. Meanwhile the really hopeful line of advance seems to me to be partly that of the wider knowledge which pours upon us in these days from many directions, historical and critical, and certainly not least from the amazing discoveries in the regions of scientific thought and philosophy. The resolution of our differences, however, will hardly be effected in the region of thought alone, or perhaps first. Hence it seems to me that the endeavour to arrive at a unity of organization is at present a mistake. We cannot have a real unity by organization; and the unity in organization must be the *expression* of and not the *means* of securing a unity of spirit that must be separately won. Our main line of progress must, I think, be to get on close personal terms of friendship and sympathy with Christians of different denominations, in common work, in common worship and in common prayer.

Here is the great value of such united prayer as the first week in January affords, and it is worth great pains to give to these common efforts a character, an order and a dignity that will make the widest possible appeal to Christian people to take part in them.

I feel myself, too, that we ought to take more frequent steps than we are disposed to, to join in common worship with one another and in one another's assemblies. That is hard, and not altogether free from the danger of misunderstandings arising. I do not fear these misunderstandings, and I am sure they should be risked. It is of course true sometimes that real principles stand in the way—principles and convictions that we are bound to respect; but it is often the case that the hindrance is really one of custom or of temperament, and of the spirit or atmosphere which is congenial to some proving uncongenial to others. Sometimes I fear it is less our principles than our prejudices which are the obstacle. I will say something further. I do not think we shall arrive at a real unity in organization till we have trained ourselves to kneel together at the same Board and receive together and at one another's hands the tokens of Divine Love in the Sacrament of Unity. It must often appear strange that it is that very sacrament of unity and of brotherly love that is the badge of our differences. That is a large subject to broach at the close of a long letter. I will only add that for myself I cannot think that His sacrament, 'Drink ye ALL of this,' ought to be regarded as the final seal of unity won (a unity, too, which is only just that of organization, and certainly not of likemindedness or of similar interpretations, since Anglo-Catholic and Evangelical and Modernist can partake together), but a vital means of bringing about a unity of spirit—we, who are many, one body, because all partakers of the one bread. Hence when I was a parish priest I always welcomed a Nonconformist guest at the Lord's table, and regarded that as quite compatible with the Prayer Book rule for Church people; and I certainly could not do anything else than commend the Churchman's action whose conscience and brotherly regard led him, if present at worship with Nonconformists, to partake with them.

The way in which we are training our ordinands, the kind of aching that is being given in our Church text-books, pulpits, id classrooms, will decide the fate of home-reunion in the near

future. Although many Modernists and Evangelicals regard the Lambeth treatment of reunion with the Free Churches as bitterly disappointing and distinctly retrogressive, we have been unable to regard it in this light. The Lambeth Fathers have felt that the opponents were too equally matched for them to be able to give a clear decision in favour of either. Ten years hence, when it is clear to our bishops in which direction the stream of ecclesiastical tendency is flowing, we shall receive the appropriate decision. Meanwhile, if we really desire the right episcopal decision, there is great need for the liberal elements in our Church life to throw themselves strenuously into the work of liberal religious teaching, and for the authorities that have liberal sympathies to give all the support they can to those efforts. The wise statesman does not legislate before he has educated the electorate.

Dr. Henson's latest plea for Disestablishment.

Dr. Henson has discovered a new reason for the immediate Disestablishment of the Church of England. It would enable the Bishops to secure obedience from their clergy. This reason will not count with those who are at present opposed to Disestablishment. It is a little difficult perhaps for prelatically-minded persons to realize that the laity feel no concern as to whether or not clergymen obey their bishops—that is the concern of the bishops, not of the laity. The laity are concerned as to whether the clergy obey the law and observe the rubrics, or whether they flout the law and Romanize the Church services. And the laity do not feel that Disestablishment would check the Romanizing of the Church. They have good reasons for thinking that Disestablishment would assist Romanizing. They know that the Deposited Book was twice rejected by Parliament because it was believed that it would sanction and promote Romanizing, and they cannot understand why some of the Bishops, in revenge for its rejection, unless they are themselves Romanizers, or suffering from wounded dignity, should wish to disestablish the Church.

The agitation for Disestablishment, if it succeeded, would reduce the Church's comprehensiveness, her resources, her

reformed character, her influence for good on the nation at large. And this is to be done because it is claimed that the English Church is essentially spiritual, and the English State is essentially secular, and because Establishment deprives the Church of its spiritual freedom. This specious claim is rejected as utterly fallacious by Dr. J. M. Wilson, who wrote in *The Times* of 4th December:

> We are not now a heathen country. We are a definitely Christian country, governed by a Christian King and a Christian Parliament. Since the time of Alfred our legislation has been definitely founded on, and is an extension and enforcement by the State of, the Christian principle not to do to others what we would not that others should do to us. This has been applied as far as possible, down to the present time, in our foreign policy as well as in our domestic legislation.
>
> Since the time of Elizabeth, Parliament has the entire charge of our poor, a definite spiritual duty. Since 1870 Parliament has taken charge of the education of the young, another spiritual duty. Matters relating to sex are largely in the hands of Parliament. How can it still be said that Parliament, with its control of foreign policy, its care for the poor, for education of the young, and other matters, is not discharging spiritual functions? Is it not true that at this moment the British Parliament is the greatest spiritual power in the world? . . .
>
> Shall we, after 1,000 years, dissociate ourselves from our own Christian State, and reduce ourselves to a mere sect, we, to whom the world is now looking as the head of the great world-wide Anglican Communion and still wider unions to come?

Apart from the serious injury which Disestablishment would do to the religious life of the nation, which is indeed the more serious consideration, it would also do grievous harm to the Church itself. Disestablishment would be combined with Disendowment and followed by Disruption. Not only would the Church lose financial resources which would grievously affect, not the clerics who supported Disestablishment, but their helpless successors, but the Church would also lose possession of the cathedrals and the collegiate and historic parish churches, for they would certainly be nationalized. *Is it worth while to pay such a price to secure larger powers for the Bishops and Church Assembly?* The answer is to be found in Dr. Henson's own words of some few years ago, although he has since retreated from them:

> 'Let us treasure it against the day when the alienations born of former wrongs shall have perished from English minds, and the visible fellowship between English Christians shall be restored, based no longer on the shifting sands of political expediency but on the indestructible foundation of a common discipleship. Of the Establishment

> of the Church of England I would venture to say in the words of the Prophet: "Destroy it not, for a blessing is in it." It enshrines the memory of a great past: it utters the prophecy of a greater future.'

However, as Dr. W. D. Morrison pointed out (in the same correspondence), Parliament in the face of the misery of extensive unemployment and the menace of an overwhelming financial crisis, has no time to spend on ecclesiastical controversies, when even ecclesiastical gladiators would do well to sheathe their swords and serve tables.

Comments and Criticism by a City Pastor.

Canon Guy Rogers, Rector of Birmingham, has produced a significant volume, *The Church and the People*.* The writer is able to take a comprehensive view of the far horizons, and yet to see in their proper perspective the details of the backyard. So many books of this sort repel by their lack of balance: the advice that their authors should pluck some feathers from the wings of their imagination and stick them into the tail of their judgment, has neither been heard nor heeded.

The themes Canon Rogers deals with are manifold, but closely related—they are the problems which face a practical and open-minded clergyman when he thinks of the English Church and its work. The Church's Witness, Home Reunion, International Peace, Sex Relations, Social Leisure, the Ministry of Women, are some of them. Well-worn themes, and we are quite weary of their treatment in books of collected essays by 'woolly' writers who never have anything either new or trenchant to say. The Rector of Birmingham's book has a stimulating freshness and helps to explain why his church is crowded with young people.

We venture to cite a few passages culled generally from its pages. Many other passages as reasonable and as suggestive could be cited.

Our first citation deals with 'the outsider':

> The outsider is visualized by the Church in a variety of ways, sometimes with exaggeration and distortion. He is prayed over, sentimentalized over, anathematized, flattered, condemned as a sinner, magnified as a saint. I remember a discussion in a certain drawing-room in London where a number of persons were assembled in conference on the subject of the outsider. Dick Sheppard and Studdert Kennedy were the principal protagonists. I can see Studdert Kennedy on one knee,

* Published by Sampson Low, price 7/6 (1930).

holding on to a chair in front of him—forgetful of his attitude, as was his wont—pouring out his soul on the wickedness of the English villages. I can see Dick Sheppard, who had also left his place, standing over him and passionately defending the essential goodness of the human heart. Here were two attitudes to the outsider—one saw him as desperately in need of what the Church might give, the other as capable of giving to the Church what the Church might desperately need (p. 36).

Our second citation deals with the treatment of the South India Scheme by the Lambeth Conference:

I desire to separate this enunciation of what seems to be a new principle in the history of Anglicanism from the various questions of expediency, with which no doubt it was surrounded in the conference. It may have been that (in the eyes of many) it was the only way out of a difficult situation, and that it was far from being accepted on its merits. It may be that a far more difficult situation has been created and that the Anglican Communion, being what it is, has added to rather than reduced its own complications. Much depends on how the Anglican Community grows up during the next ten years to the situation which has been created (p. 75).

Our third citation deals with pacifist propaganda:

A number of the keenest Christians in all the Churches now take what is called the full pacifist position, and are impatient with their brethren who hesitate over some of its implications. From outside the Church, especially from some members of the Labour movement, comes an insistent demand that the Church should repair its honour, tarnished in the late war, by cutting itself off from every sign of association with anything military in the national life.

My own sympathy is so strongly on the side of peace that I am sometimes tempted to accept the pacifist position in spite of certain weaknesses and inconsistencies which I think I see in it, but the point I desire to make in this brief statement is that pacifist 'witness' does not always dispose people to peace, and there is room, as I will try to show, for another kind of treatment of the subject which aims at securing the same results. I can remember, as a boy, when I read the story of how Peter the Hermit preached the first Crusade, and of how the people responded with the cry *Deus Vult*, that it never occurred to me that all wars were contrary to the Will of God . . . I do not think that this way of looking at war ought to be entirely dismissed as schoolboy ethics unworthy of the serious attention of those whose business it is to expound to the younger generation a satisfying theory of peace . . .

A great many of the arguments for peace leave these people—and much wiser and more experienced people—cold; while much of the literature on the subject is too high-brow to be effective. The 'all or nothing' policy of certain pacifists, who condemn war root and branch equally as regards the past and for the future, plays havoc with their historical sense . . .

While it is admitted that romance has departed from modern war (though the tradition dies hard), the heroism of the common soldier remains as something which always commands respect in a shoddy

world. There is a stubborn determination that when 'values' are being discussed and virtue crowned, this particular flowering of the human race shall not be forgotten or ignored. Common-sense people will not have it that all war is murder, or every soldier a homicidal criminal, or every Army Chaplain an apostate to his faith . . .

The task as I see it which lies before those of us who are sworn, for varying reasons, to promote peace is to study the mentality of those whom we desire to convert, and to meet them with respect and sincerity on their own ground. When I think of what I have seen personally in the War of 1914—1918 (do not call it 'The Great War'; that is the old trick of investing war with romance reasserting itself involuntarily)—when I think of the stench and the blood and the mangled bits of beautiful human bodies, of the heart-ache and the agony and the destruction and the waste, it is difficult to keep calm, to argue or to state a case. A blind fury possesses me for the moment. The one thing I want to do is to abolish this accursed thing called War. But a new generation is growing up which will seek its own experience independently of mine. It will not be shouted at, though it may be reasoned with; and, if I am not mistaken, we shall have to take quite patiently and seriously those who invest war with a romance which they deny to peace, or who visualize the possibility of a war in the light of a Crusade . . .

It is for the revaluation of Peace as a great constructive ideal that the ability and the enthusiasm of the younger generation is so sorely needed (p. 186 f).

Our fourth citation deals with the use of leisure:

There are certain tendencies, however, in the modern use of leisure which the Church, in company with educationists and artists, must deplore. There is, for example, the gradual decay of the power to amuse oneself or to find amusement in creative work. The people are catered for in the mass, and mass production rules their leisure hours . . . The Church in its constant witness to the value of personality, joins in the general word of caution which lovers of art and creative work of all kinds would venture to utter on the danger of receiving too much and creating too little.

The cost of amusement is another matter on which the Church has some witness to give. Great numbers of people are spending far more than they can afford on one form of amusement or another. The Church, while it must continue its efforts to secure a higher standard of living for the poorer members of the community, cannot possibly neglect to try and save the nation from its present epidemic of extravagance. Sometimes it would almost seem as if the poorer we get the more we feel entitled to spend. There is a certain recklessness noticeable which may possibly be accounted for by the prevailing pessimism about the revival of trade. It is rather like a return of the war psychology which prompted men to say, 'Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die.' There was more excuse, however, in those days for such a materialistic philosophy than now. Unjustifiable extravagance is the only verdict which can be passed upon the amount spent on pleasure by great numbers of people of all classes . . .

The most difficult 'witness,' however, which the Church has to give on the question of the people's leisure, is usually connected with the question of Sunday Observance. Sabbatarianism is dead so far as per-

sonal liberty is concerned, and it is generally admitted that Sunday is given not only for worship, but for the re-creation of body, mind and spirit. The question of the provision which shall be made in a community for those who desire to be entertained on Sunday is one which is constantly agitating the larger centres of population in this country. . . . Canada prohibits all forms of sport and entertainment on Sunday where a fee is charged either directly or indirectly. Without a fee any form of public entertainment is permissible. It is a reasonable line for the Church to take that these entertainments, if on one ground or another they are found to be necessary, should be placed on the same voluntary basis as the Church itself. Meantime, no pains should be spared in trying to create the public spirit which will seek to minister to the needs of these people who want somewhere to meet one another on Sunday evening (pp. 193 f).

Of the author's treatment of each of the themes, we may say *Acu tetigisti*—you have gone to the heart of the problem. We hope this volume as an exposition of sane, practical, reverent Modernism will be widely read.

Islam and the Sword.

The great religions which have inherited moral standards based on the literal interpretation of texts in their sacred scriptures are being hard put to it to-day. Islam with its fundamental belief in the supreme authority of an infallible and verbally inspired *Quran*, is in the tightest of corners in this modern world.

The *Quranic* prohibition of interest falls heavily on the Prophet's followers who are engaged in commercial and industrial undertakings to-day.

The *Quaranic* permission to the faithful Muslim to have four wives at the same time, if he feels able to do his duty by them, is deeply resented by feminist protagonists in the East.

The latest, though probably not the last, of these moral difficulties has arisen in connection with the growing conviction of our modern civilization that war is immoral and impermissible.

Islam has been presented to mankind as 'The Religion of the Sword.' By the sword it extended itself, by the sword it maintained its authority. This was understood to be both its right and its duty.

The *Islamic Review* (for January, 1931) contains an able article on 'Ethics of War,' which concludes as follows:

> 'In short, the world has always needed good ethics of war, and Islam came to meet the demand. It prohibited all such fightings as were waged for the sake of gaining possession of the land and property

> of others, or was entered into in the name of religion. Islam came to maintain the peace of the world, as its very name shows, and permitted the unsheathing of the sword in defence of life and property and religion, where they were disturbed without any just cause.

Perhaps it is hardly permitted to a Christian, who is deeply conscious how far Christian practice has fallen below the level of the Christian ethical standard, to remark that in the light of Mohammedan history, it is surprising to note how very little these Islamic prohibitions of unrighteous war have been observed. In the light, however, of the following passages from the *Quran* cited in the article in question, it is easily comprehensible that the Muslims of more primitive times, who being well aware of how much their Prophet and his cause owed to the sword, believed that the *Quran* not only permitted the defence, but even required the propagation of their religion by the sword.

> 'Permission (to fight) is given to those upon whom war is made because they are oppressed, and most surely Allah is well able to assist them'; 'Those who have been expelled from their homes without a just cause except that they say, Our Lord is Allah' (xxii, 39-40).
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> 'And prepare against them what force you can and horses tied at the frontier, to frighten thereby the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others beside them, whom you do not know, (but) Allah knows them; and whatever thing you will spend in Allah's way, it will be paid back to you fully and you shall not be dealt with unjustly' (viii, 60).
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> 'Say to those who disbelieve, if they desist, that which is past shall be forgiven to them; and if they return, then what has happened to the ancients has already passed.
>
> 'And fight with them until there is no more persecution and religion should be only for Allah; but if they desist, then surely Allah sees what they do.
>
> 'And if they turn back, then know that Allah is your Patron; most excellent is the Patron and most excellent the Helper' (viii, 38-40).
>
> 'If you demanded a judgment, the judgment has then indeed come to you; and if you desist, it will be better for you; and if you turn back (to fight), We (too) shall turn back, and your forces shall avail you nothing, though they may be many, and (know) that Allah is with the believers' (viii, 19).

This modern interpretation of the 'fighting texts' in the *Quran* brings it into harmony with the official teaching of the Church of England on this important subject. It is found in one brief sentence in Article xxxvii:

> 'It is lawful for Christian men at the commandment of the Magistrate to wear weapons, and serve in the wars.'

In the Latin Articles, which are of equal authority with the English, the phrase is *bellis justis*—'in *righteous wars*.'

GOD AND THE UNIVERSE*

By Sir Francis Younghusband, K.C.I.E., D.Sc., author of *The Heart of Nature,* etc.

THERE are those who approach this subject by first defining what they mean by God, and then examining the universe to see if they can find in it a God as so defined. Very often they don't. They are then termed atheists and thought to be very wicked. Or they themselves take a certain pride in having discovered that there is no God.

I have adopted the exactly opposite course. I have begun with the universe. I have carefully observed it, and I have listened to all that Science has to say about it, and if I have found working in it a spiritual agency making on the whole for good, then I have assumed that there is a Power behind the universe which we may legitimately term God.

And I adopted this method because from the time that I was a very young man, I have had exceptional opportunities of observing the physical universe and of reflecting on what I saw. When only twenty-one I made a journey by myself through the outer Himalaya and first got a 'feel' of great mountains, such as it is hard to experience in the crowded Alps. And ever since then, either in the forests of Manchuria, or in the deserts of Central Asia, or in the remotest and loftiest regions of the Himalaya I have had long periods of lonely commune with Nature. And of commune with the stars also, for in the Desert of Gobi I travelled at night for ten weeks, and in the mountains I slept on the ground in the open, thus getting a 'feel' for the universe as a whole and not only for this earth.

Then my travels brought me in contact with many men of science—with students of natural history, geology, astronomy and many other branches of science. And I had ample leisure to read. When I held posts on the Indian frontier with only one other officer as a companion and not always even one, I had many hours every day at my disposal for the study of that which has always interested me most, namely, the ultimate nature of

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the universe. Thus I had grand opportunities for studying the universe under circumstances of closest contact with it.

And as we contemplate the physical universe, the main impression we get is of its immensity. And this immensity is in itself a fact of great significance. For it will affect our whole outlook on the world, and make us realize that what may be impossible in a universe of the dimensions the ancients considered it to be may be quite possible in a universe of this stupendous size. Nor need we feel daunted by the mere size of the universe any more than we should feel humbled at the mere size of a Himalayan peak. Rather should the physical magnitude magnify our spirit. Some are depressed at the thought of their own insignificance in comparison with a mountain like Kanchenjunga. And likewise some are depressed by the colossal dimensions of the universe. They seem so puny in comparison. But those of a finer spirit are exalted at the sight of a great mountain. Its far-off heights draw their spirit up to them. And, likewise, they feel their spirit expand as they contemplate the scarcely imaginable dimensions of the universe. It is in this spirit that I would approach the universe this afternoon.

What then are the dimensions of the universe so far as is at present known? The furthest object which can be seen through the most powerful telescope is a spiral nebula 140 million light-years away. What is a spiral nebula? It is a swirl of incandescent gas of extreme tenuity, revolving like a Catherine-wheel firework with great velocity and throwing off perhaps two or three million sparks, each one of which becomes a star like our own sun, which is itself the outcome of a similar nebula. This spiral nebula, which is the furthest visible object, must be millions of times larger than our whole solar system and yet it is quite invisible to the naked eye and to every other telescope except this one most powerful of all telescopes in the Mount Wilson observatory. Thus distant is it. It is, as I have said, 140 million light-years away. That is to say, the light from it travelling at the rate of 186,000 miles in every second has taken 140 million years to reach this planet. We are only seeing to-day the nebula as it was 140 million years ago. And if that nebula had any means of seeing the earth, it would see it to-day as it was long before man or any of the higher animals had appeared upon it.

This is distant enough. But there must be astronomical objects at a greater distance still. Yet this process of finding further and further objects cannot go on for ever. There is a limit. There must be a furthest object. And then we would begin to see the same objects over again and eventually see the backs of our own heads—in theory at least—for space is curved. The physical universe is unimaginably large, but it is finite.

So also is the number of the stars, though that too is as wonderful as their distance. If we were to cover London with sand till even the top of St. Paul's was hidden, and if each grain of sand were taken to represent one star we should think the number of stars astounding. How could there possibly be so many stars as that we should think. Yet that in fact does not anything like represent the actual number. Even if we piled up sand to twice the height of St. Paul's it would not be enough. We should have to extend that layer of sand till it covered the whole of England before we had got a sufficiency, and each grain of sand representing a star! Though in the universe the stars are not packed close together as the grains of sand are in a heap. They are at enormous distances apart. For example, the nearest star to us is so distant that light travelling at the rate of 186,000 miles a second takes $4\frac{1}{2}$ years to reach here.

We now have an idea of the sheer immensity of the universe. The next most noticeable thing about it is its activity. There is no such thing as inactivity—not for the minutest fraction of a second—anywhere. A great granite mountain looks about as fixed and unchangeable as a thing well could be. Yet science tells us that slowly and imperceptibly through millions of years, it has been upheaved from beneath the surface of the earth, and that slowly and imperceptibly it is being denuded by the action of the weather until eventually it will assume the rounded, gracefully-curved form of our downlands. Science tells us more. It says that solid as the mountain looks it is composed of countless atoms, and groups of atoms, in the most violent activity, and that each atom, though far too small to be visible through even the most powerful microscope, resembles a miniature solar system with a nucleus of positive electricity and one or more electrons of negative electricity revolving round it with terrific speed. The solid, immobile-looking rock is therefore the scene of intensest activity.

So also is it with the stars. Not only are they ceaselessly moving through space, but they too are composed of atoms—and atoms of the same material as we find on this earth—in a very fury of activity. And as with the rocks, and the stars, so with the plants and trees, and with the bodies of animals and men. All are made up of atoms—themselves the scene of ceaseless activity—in perpetual activity building up or breaking down.

So everywhere and everywhen there is activity—and activity of inconceivable intensity.

Yet with all this activity there is order. Each tiniest particle acts of itself, in accordance with the dictates of its own particular nature. But it is subject to law. There is order everywhere. Nowhere—not even temporarily—is there chaos. There may be a break-up of a larger body into component parts. But that break-up will itself be according to law. Even an earthquake or a volcanic eruption is in accordance with law. And the component parts themselves act in a perfectly orderly fashion.

And here I would make my first point. If with all this unceasing activity there is order, there must be in the universe some factor, or agency directing the activity. The universe must be of such a nature that though intensely active, it has that within it which regulates its activity.

And now we come to a fact of the highest significance, namely, the interdependence of things. Each minutest particle in the universe affects and is affected by all other parts and the whole. Through and through the universe there is inter-connection, inter-relation, interdependence. All is held together as a whole—as an organic whole. And this means that each tiniest particle does in some slight measure bear upon it the impress of the whole. All the parts, some in small measure, others in large, have stamped upon them the signature of the whole. And this we may the better understand when we reflect that the ultimate particles of matter, the electrons and protons, are not hard, gritty bits of material, but highly active centres of electrical energy. And of these in their groupings and ever-increasing complexity of grouping, all things and all beings, are made in every quarter of the universe. Each part therefore, however small, is both highly impressionable and highly expressive. Given the interdependence of things, the fact that each part bears the image of the whole is comprehensible.

A further observation to be made is that the universe exhibits progress. We cannot say that the universe as a whole makes progress. It is possible that in the universe there may always be parts on which progress has reached its zenith and decline has begun, and other parts where decline has reached its nadir and an upward progress begun. But in that minute fraction of the universe with which we are particularly acquainted, namely, our solar system, there has been decided progress. Two thousand million years ago the earth was still a part of that globe of fiery gas which is our sun. Then as a tiny droplet it was drawn away from the sun, probably by the attraction of some passing star. It cooled to liquid, and then became solid. A thousand million years ago minute specks of protoplasm appeared—the earliest forms of life. These grew and multiplied and developed into higher and higher forms. Plants and animals grew out of the lowliest forms of life; and finally man out of the higher animals. In that one thousand million years there was unbelievable progress. There was retrogression also in certain groups. But in the main, on the whole sweep, there was amazing progress.

Thus there is *progress*. But progress towards what? In what direction is life progressing? Until we know that we cannot understand the nature of that agency in virtue of which order is maintained and progress made. And to know the direction we must study the highest products produced. Man is the highest product we know of. And if we reflect on how each one of us was produced—how it was that each one of us came into the world at all—we shall have one means ready to hand to all of knowing the chief characteristic of that factor which is operating through the universe to bring about progress. We know that it was only as our parents were brought up to the highest intensity of love that we were born into the world. Each of us had his or her origin in love of the intensest kind. Besides that, we know that it was only through mother-love of the tenderest, most self-sacrificing nature that we were nurtured till we could fend for ourselves. So here again, in mother-love, is another indication of what the governing factor in the universe is like.

Then as we grow we find ourselves members of a community called our country. And we learn that for centuries before we

were born, it had been preparing for us. Our countrymen in the past had planned and worked and fought and sacrificed their lives in order that we might be able to live a fuller and a richer life than they had ever been able to lead. We find our country preserving order, protecting our lives and our property, looking after our health, educating us, providing for us in case of sickness or old age, but at the same time expecting of us that we, in our turn, should do our duty by her—do that which is owing to her for all that she has done for us.

And as we realize all this we grow to love her. If she is attacked, or is in danger, we instantly abandon every comfort, and even our dearest, and, in a transport of delight at this opportunity of serving her readily risk our lives that she may live, and that all the great heritage be handed intact to those who follow after. So, again, in this love of country as we feel it in the supreme moment of some national crisis we are in intimate touch with that agency we are seeking for.

Then besides finding ourselves members of that community which we call our country, we feel a kinship with the whole great world about us—with our fellow-men, with the animals and plants and with all nature. And this too we grow to love. Ordinarily, we hardly notice how much the world is to us. We take it as much for granted as the air we breathe. But when we are shut off from it, when we are on the bed of sickness, how we cling to it! how we pine for it! How beautiful it all seems! How we love it! Then in special moments of buoyant health, when all about is bathed in glowing sunshine, and Nature's face is all smiles, how our whole hearts go out to her! How thankful we are to be alive! How we rejoice in the great, great glories of the world!

Then a few—though perhaps more than we think—have in rare and precious moments of their lives, a far intenser experience than any of these of the reciprocal love of us for the world and of the world for us. As an example, I will take the case of one living to-day—the anonymous authoress of the *Golden Fountain*. And I quote her because I have been fortunate enough to have had a very similar experience myself and can understand therefore the truth of what she describes.

She was always devoted to the beautiful in nature. In solitude and in silence she would contemplate the beauty of a dis-

ant scene, or of the sky, or a flower. And in so doing she would nhale the very essence of the beautiful. Then one day during the war, when she was in great anguish of soul, as she stood upon a hill by herself she was suddenly surrounded by a whiteness, like a great light, and there began to pour into her an indescribable great vitality. She was like a free spirit and tasted for some moments a new form of living. Words, she says, are unable to convey the splendour of it, the boundless joy, the liberty, the glory of it. She was so filled with love that she had to cry aloud her love, so great was the force and the wonder and the delight and the might of it. She walked away as a new creature in a new world. Her heart felt like the heart of an angel, glowing white hot with the love for God; and all her sorrows fled in a vast joy. He had poured the joys of Paradise into her soul. Never was such inconceivable joy—never was such gladness. So in radiant words has she described her experience.

Now one thing in especial we have to remark about all these experiences — about wedded-love, about mother-love, about love of country, about world-love. In all of them there is something unspeakably sacred. We do not like to talk about them. We feel that we have for the moment trod on holy ground. The experiences have only come to us when we have been keyed up and at our best and in a state of intensest sensitivity. And in them we feel by instinct that we have touched something too holy to be spoken of in the common intercourse of daily life, though from within the sanctuary of our hearts it may tinge and tincture all we do.

We have fallen in love with the whole world and we have felt the world in love with us. And in this experience we have touched for one precious moment the very heart-beat of the universe. We have caught a fleeting vision of that which drives the world.

For that experience is the highest thing we know—and of it Christ in His Baptism by the Holy Ghost is the supreme example—and must therefore be the main characteristic of the universe as a whole. It has appeared on this earth and this earth sprang from the sun. But it could not have derived from the sun of the sun's self alone. It could not have derived from the sun unless the sun and the entire solar system were acted on

by some quality or factor or agency in the universe as a whole which possessed at least the highest holiness we know of. It is too commonly assumed that Darwin's great theory of Natural Selection and survival of the fittest is sufficient to account for the rise of everything that has appeared on this earth. But Darwin's theory only deals with matters after life has appeared. It has nothing to do with the root motive of things, and Darwin never pretended that it did. How it was that life first appeared on this droplet from the sun and what gave rise to those variations which were slightly better than the rest so that they were chosen and the other rejected; and above all who that 'Nature' is who can select—that is, exercise mental judgment and have in mind a standard to judge by—he never attempted to say. All he was concerned with was to show that the higher forms, including man, did come from lower forms. But what did not concern Darwin does concern us here to-day. We are concerned with the universe as a whole. And not only with that physical universe upon whose immensity we have already dwelt, but with the entire totality of things, including mind. And we want to know how from our sun, which is no exceptional star—no central star of the universe, as it was once supposed to be, but only one among millions of millions of others—there could have developed beings capable of finding out so much about the universe as astronomers have discovered. We want to know how out of a ball of fiery mist life and mind and love could have sprung forth. This is the miracle of miracles which has to be accounted for. And we can only account for it by presuming that in the universe as a whole and acting all the time upon the sun and the solar system is a factor or agency possessed of qualities at least as high as those which the highest men have displayed. The sun of itself could not have produced life and love. And if—or rather, as—life and love have appeared, the solar system must have been acted on by an agency containing within it at least life and mind and love. And it must have been in virtue of the impression which this agency in the universe as a whole was exerting upon that small part of it, the solar system, that man with his mind and his feelings arose on this earth.

And we are driven to make this inference because, as we have seen, the universe is an organism. It is interdependent, through and through. Each part of the universe is so affected by the

whole that it bears upon it in some measure the impress of the whole. And if life and love have appeared in our solar system this means that life and love must be a characteristic of the universe as a whole. There must be that in the universe as a whole which can produce life and love. And we must conclude that that element in the universe which regulates the ceaseless activity and maintains order, must also be the motive power of progress. And if that progress is towards holiness, then those who have seen the beauty of holiness have seen God.

And God is as much within the world as above it, and as much above it as within it. He as much urges the world from beneath and within as lures it from above and without. And He is as much utterly impersonal as He is the one and only true and complete Person in the entire universe. God is the great 'I' of the universe, the great 'I am.'

And with this conception of God in our minds let us stand back for a moment and take a comprehensive view of the universe. We shall then see that we here bear much the same relation to the universe as the atoms of which my body is composed bear to me. In thinking out this address and now delivering it, I must have impressed myself on a number of groups of atoms in my body. And if those microscopic entities met together to discuss me, they would be impressed by my immensity and a few might get an inkling of that self which animates the whole—that is, of me. I should be working in those groups of atoms and they would in some measure bear my image, but I should also far transcend them.

So in the universe there is a Self which while working in the Solar system and this Earth and us men and impressing itself upon us, is working in the universe at large and is also far transcendent to it. In all the myriads of stars, more numerous than the grains of sand upon the seashore, there must be millions with planets like this earth. And on perhaps hundreds of those planets there must be beings far higher than us men—not indeed in form like us—perhaps composed of different chemical elements and living under wholly different conditions—but excelling us far in the fineness and delicacy of their natures, and in being more deeply imbued with the Holy Spirit of the universe. They would live a life of an intensity of which we with our gross bodies are wholly incapable. And on one planet of

one star there would be, we may imagine, a few beings who in a supreme degree would manifest and show forth the eternal spirit of the universe. In the long passage of time these beings would decline, and beings on another planet of another star would then become supreme manifestations. But always somewhere in the universe there would be beings at the very acme of perfection, while always somewhere there would be beings in whom the bare beginnings of life were only just becoming manifest. And through all the same Spirit would be eternally operating, world without end.

And as far as we ourselves on this planet are concerned, we are only in the very infancy of our development—in the lowest, crudest, almost barbaric forms. As we have seen, life has existed here for only a thousand million years; and this planet has before it a life of not only a million million years, but of several million million years. When we think how life has developed from those specks of slime to man in the brief period that life has yet existed here, what may we not develop into in a period a thousand times as great? The possibilities are beyond all conception.

A contemplation of the universe should then fill us with an immense Hope, an unassailable Faith, and over-bounding Love. But, far exceeding these, with a sense of Holiness, as in the presence of a Spirit transcendent beyond all power of imagination.

The God which a contemplation of the universe as revealed by science and by the most intimate spiritual experience of our highest manifests is as far above the old Abrahamic God of our childhood as the most perfect saint is above a schoolboy. He is of a Might, a Majesty, a Holiness, before which we can only close our eyes in awe. Inexorable He may be in His discipline, as the only way to perfection. Yet withal He is of a long patience and tender loving-kindness which cares for the least and meanest, and in the final process of things saves all.

This to me is the God that the universe declares. And my conception of Him only deepens and expands as the revelations of science multiply and increase in wonder, and as my own experience accumulates. The great days of God are only beginning to dawn.

THE TRAGEDY OF REGINALD PECOCK

'I am in a strait between two things, and hesitate whether to be burnt to death or to be an object of scorn and derision to others.'

SUCH was the mournful utterance of Reginald Pecock, Bishop of Chichester, on November 28th, 1457, when he was offered by the Primate the choice between death by burning and abjuration of his opinions. When Pecock thus stood before the Archbishop and a crowd of bishops and doctors of theology, doomed to lose either his reputation or his life, he was in a position never occupied by any other English bishop before the Reformation. He was the first and last mediaeval English bishop 'to be formally tried for heresy.'

This fact alone invests his name with a peculiar interest. But Pecock is famous for other reasons.

He was a mediaeval Hooker, the apologist of the mediaeval Church, just as was Hooker the apologist of the post-Reformation Church. He resembled Hooker in his power of close and careful reasoning, in his philosophical temper and in his consideration for his opponents. It would be hard to find any ecclesiastical mediaeval writer who excelled Pecock in the fine qualities which constitute a great apologist. Just as Hooker defended the institution of the Church against those who, to use Izaac Walton's language, 'sought the reformation of the laws and orders ecclesiastical in the Church of England,' so Pecock stood pre-eminent in his day as an enlightened defender of the Church against the Lollards. It is his supreme merit that he essayed to win them not by threats and objurgations, far less by the savage methods of 'fire, sword and hangment,' but by appeals to their sense and reason.

For the long period of twenty years during which he was issuing his books, he was known and either admired or disliked by all the clergy and many of the laity in the country. In his happier days he seems to have had a great following among the younger clergy, by whom he was described as 'the greatest scientific reasoner' in the world. No one questioned his ability nor doubted that a star of the first magnitude had risen.

How, then, has it come to pass that to a hundred persons who know the names of Latimer, Jewel and Hooker, there is not at the present day more than one who is acquainted with the name and fame of Pecock? The reasons are clear. Pecock was a prolific writer, but the works which have escaped the vengeful clutches of his enemies are but few in number. The survivors, *exigua manus*, with the exception of *The Repressor of over much blaming of the clergy*, have not been printed and exist only in manuscript. *The Repressor* itself is a masterpiece of thought and careful reasoning. Pecock wrote this book in English in the hope that he would thus make it accessible to the Lollards, for whose consideration it was designed. Pecock's English, unlike the contemporary Paston letters, is in places almost impossible to follow except with the aid of a glossary, and, even with this help, it requires careful reading. The average student is repelled by these obstacles.

It is not too much to say that if these difficulties were removed, if, in fact, *The Repressor* were attractively modernized, the number of its readers would be multiplied many times. For no one who turned over the pages could fail to be charmed by the philosophy, the logic, the wit, the learning and the kindly feeling of this Apollos of mediaeval England.

The vast range of Pecock's attainments and the undoubted fact that he was born out of due season, centuries before his time, are evident in *The Repressor*. Though he lived in an uncritical age, he shows that he had carefully thought out for himself problems connected with the Old Testament, the Apocrypha, and the New Testament. The Fathers are frequently referred to but are by no means regarded as authorities, whose words are not to be gainsaid. Pecock says, for example, of St. Jerome:

> 'Certes his tongue is not the Key of Heaven or of earth, neither had power to make anything to be true or false, or otherwise than he could find it to be true or false in doom of reason or of Holy Scripture';

and we know from other sources that Pecock was in the habit of interjecting the word 'Pooh' when the Fathers were quoted. His attitude towards them, though not very sympathetic, was far more so than that of Gaisford, a modern scholar and Dean of Christ Church, who died in 1855. T. Mozley tells us that 'Gaisford was once showing the library of Christ Church to a

visitor. He walked rapidly past the Fathers, and, waving his hand, said, "Sad rubbish—the Fathers," and this was all he said.'

Pecock was far too well acquainted with the merits of some of the Fathers to utter a *dictum* at once so sweeping and so absurd. He speaks, for example, of a long passage from St. Augustine as 'clearly, sweetly, and reasonably written.' Pecock displays a wide knowledge of ecclesiastical history and of former heresies. He attached the greatest importance to natural religion. He had given close attention to the study of logic and of moral philosophy. Like all the abler mediaeval ecclesiastics, he was well versed in the Canon law. Thus equipped with armour of proof and aided by dialectical skill, Pecock felt that he could confront single-handed all and sundry of the Lollard and Wycliffite arguments against the Established Church. It may be added that Pecock, unlike several contemporary prelates, among them Archbishop Stafford, was a man of stainless character. His enemies have laid no serious moral fault to his charge. It was never asserted that, busy though he constantly was with literary work, he neglected his episcopal duties. The one human frailty laid to his charge is that of a certain pride of intellect which made him suppose that his utterances were oracular, his arguments irresistible. The manner in which this infirmity was dwelt upon is a proof of the envy with which his talents were regarded by lesser men, who paid off the score by detraction.

Nothing is known of Pecock's birthplace or of his parentage. We find, however, that he was a Welshman, born in the diocese of St. David's towards the close of the fourteenth century. His early education, perhaps obtained in the Cathedral School of St. David's, provided him with 'the key of knowledge,' a sound acquaintance with the elements of Latin. So good was his progress that he was sent to Oriel College, Oxford—centuries later to be the home of J. H. Newman, who, like Pecock, became the centre of a theological cyclone. The authorities of the College recognized Pecock's promise by awarding him a Fellowship in 1417. His passage through the grades of the ministerial office was rapid, for within a period of three months, Pecock was ordained acolyte, sub-deacon, deacon and priest. He was soon afterwards brought to the notice of Humphrey, Duke of Glou-

cester, the Protector of the Realm, a Maecenas who was always the friend and patron of literary men. The young Fellow of Oriel entered the Duke's service and lived at court. He thus acquired that knowledge of men and of practical affairs which are so evident in the *Repressor*.

In 1431, Pecock became Master of the College of the Holy Spirit and St. Mary, founded by the famous Richard Whittington. The rectory of St. Michael in Riola was attached to the Mastership. Pecock held these appointments for thirteen years, and during that period of comparative leisure wrote many of those works, of some of which only the titles remain.

The severest measures had for some years been taken against the Lollards under the Statute *De Haeretico comburendo*. This sanguinary Act, which committed impenitent heretics to the flames, had been passed in the reign of Henry IV owing to the insistence of Arundel, the Primate. That prelate is always described by the well-known Oriel scholar, Gascoigne, the contemporary and the enemy of Pecock, as Bachelor of Arts and Archbishop of Canterbury. Gascoigne thus covertly expresses his contempt of Arundel and his low opinion of a man whose literary attainments were those only of boys of fifteen or sixteen.

Not only had many Lollards themselves perished at the stake as a holocaust to Arundel's bigotry, but innumerable Lollard pamphlets had also fed the flames by the orders of the Bishops. In spite of this formidable persecution, Lollardism still flourished — *simili frondescit virga metallo* — and was a powerful influence in the country during the long reign of Henry VI, the period which Pecock adorned.

Moving in the centre of city life, he discovered how numerous were the Londoners who were Lollards in opinion, whether they took every risk or masked their sentiments from the public eye.

By conversing with his parishioners and by the study of Lollard tracts Pecock became familiar with the standpoint and with the tenets of these 'Bible men.' He knew well and he has admitted that the abuses in the Church which they denounced, were real and some of them extremely grave. On the other hand, he felt that the Lollard condemnations were unqualified by even the scantiest recognition of any merit in the institution so unsparingly denounced. Moreover, he found that while the Lol-

ards made the Bible the sole source of religious, and even of moral, truth, they were guided by no standard of values in estimating its contents. They dissociated text from context, regarded all the constituent parts of Scripture as of equal importance, imagined that the customs of one age were obligatory on another, and made what was particular, general, and what was allegorical, literal. Some among them went so far as to believe that the most ignorant of men could penetrate the sense of the sacred writings by means of an inward spiritual light not vouchsafed to earthly attainments.

The disaffection of the Lollards to the Church was then in part doctrinal. They attached no weight to the decisions of Popes and Councils or to traditional usage, but regarded the Bible as the one and all-sufficient authority. Their disaffection was also due in part to the ill practices which they saw around them and of which a few examples must suffice. The appointment to episcopal office depended, we are told, on three things, the will of the King, the will of the Pope, and the payment of a large sum of money to the latter. The working of this system was often unsatisfactory. Pecock himself says that

> 'Virtuous men and well proved in learning and living be not taken into prelacies, but sometimes men wantonly brought up in Court, somewhile men for their great blood and high birth.'

Thus George Neville, after holding a canonry at Salisbury from boyhood, was nominated to the see of Exeter when only twenty-three years of age, and consecrated when twenty-seven. The all-sufficient reason for his promotion was that he was the brother of the King-maker, the Earl of Warwick. In accordance with long custom, several of the Bishops were Ministers of the Crown. Their faces in consequence were hardly known in their dioceses, and their spiritual duties were performed by deputies. Two of these non-resident bishops were slain by mobs in the reign of Henry VI, and the sole charge against them was that they had neglected the functions of their office for service at the Court. Cade's rebellion was marked by attacks on the persons and property of the clergy. Latimer's words uttered nearly a hundred years later were true of some of the prelates of Pecock's time. Latimer, in his usual forcible style, speaks of such bishops as 'so troubled with lordly living, so placed in palaces, couched

in Courts, ruffling in their tents, burdened with embassies,' that they could not be spiritual overseers. Men spoke of the bishops in exactly the same spirit in Lollard days.

> 'Shame on the Bishops,' they cried, 'who grow rich, who like to be served on bended knee, ride about in state and will not preach for the salvation of souls.'

If exception were taken to the episcopate, abuses still more startling were found in lesser appointments. The deaneries and cathedral stalls were often held by foreigners nominated by the Pope. Livings were as frequently in the hands of non-resident and pluralist vicars and even of laymen and minors. The duties in consequence were badly and irregularly performed by ill-paid deputies with no money 'to buy themselves books nor give their neighbour drink, for all the great gain went another way.'

Is it any wonder that the Lollards pointed at these abuses the finger of scorn? Even lovers of the ancient doctrine were covered with shame and confusion when they thought of the corruption of their Church.

In 1444, Pecock was appointed to the Bishopric of St. Asaph, probably through the influence of his patron, the Duke of Gloucester. In 1447, Pecock preached a sermon at St. Paul's Cross. It was in effect mainly in answer to Lollard censures of non-resident and unpreaching prelates and an acute and subtle apology for them. As Thorold Rogers remarks, this sermon had the effect of making Pecock 'highly popular with his episcopal brethren.'

Pecock declared in this famous discourse that it was noway an essential part of a bishop's duty to preach. Had he unlimited time at his disposal and had he nothing else to do but preach? On the contrary, he was a man of affairs with many claims on his attention, among which was the solution of difficult theological problems. It was therefore unreasonable to expect him to be personally responsible for giving elementary instruction by means of sermons, except when he was so inclined. Pecock further maintained that a bishop's non-residence was frequently necessary and meritorious. How otherwise could bishops render the national services which they were often expected to perform? The conclusion of the sermon was devoted to the proof of the

osition that the payment to the Pope of Annates or the first ear's income of bishoprics was not simoniacal. The bishops, Pecock argued, gave nothing to the Pope. Was he not the real wner of the entire revenues of the Church? Were not the ishops his stewards? And when they paid him five thousand narks or more on their appointment, what else were they doing ut handing him what was already his own?

There were passages in the sermon which were either paradoxical or which contained a suspicion of unorthodoxy, for Archbishop Stafford was persuaded to cite Pecock before him. Pecock seems to have acquitted himself to Stafford's satisfaction. He explained that he had preached the sermon for two reasons. The bishops were the objects of detraction and contempt, from which he had attempted to rescue them. He had desired also to reassure bishops who were compelled to discharge duties which lay outside their dioceses. He had found that their consciences were uneasy, when there was really no reason for self-accusation. Far from assuaging the popular discontent with the bishops, Pecock's sermon served rather to inflame it. He was regarded as the apologist of neglect of duty, and his own habit of constantly preaching was considered as a practical condemnation of the episcopal failings of others. Although Pecock's sermon was reprobated by the friars and many of the regular clergy, his position in the Church was to outer seeming more secure than ever when he was nominated to the Bishopric of Chichester in 1450. His promotion immediately followed the publication of *The Repressor of over much blaming of the Clergy*, which appeared in the same year, and though written in the interests of the Church, was the subject of bitter attacks by many prominent divines. Pecock's enemies apparently were waiting for an opportunity when his destruction would be certain. The first part of the *Repressor* consists of a refutation of the doctrinal errors of the Lollards. The second part is a vindication of ecclesiastical usages which the Lollards censured. The question invariably put by a Lollard when confronted with a religious doctrine or practice was, 'Where groundest thou it in Scripture?' Such a man must indeed have been surprised to be told in *The Repressor* that natural religion was superior to Scripture and that Scripture was not the 'ground' or origin of the

moral law. For instance, the fact that Christ commanded men to be merciful assumed their previous knowledge of this virtue. That knowledge was derived from natural religion. Pecock thus states his position. 'It belongeth not to Holy Scripture to ground any governance, or deed or service of God, or any law of God, or any truth which man's reason by nature may find, learn or know.'

Holy Scripture, he says, though not the 'ground' of the moral law, earnestly persuades men to obey it. The moral law is itself to be found in 'the inward precious book and writing buried in man's soul.'

But whereas Scripture is not, according to Pecock, the 'ground' of the moral law, it is the 'ground' of belief in Christ, in His Sacraments and in such ordinances as He has appointed.

Not only did the Lollards base their more purely religious belief on Scripture alone, but even imagined that it contained guidance for every detail of ordinary life. Pecock's refutation of this extravagance is easy. He asks where mention is made of clocks in the Bible? Where is anything said about running, jumping, shooting, quoits, singing and playing on musical instruments for amusement? Where is allusion made to the brewing of ale? Yet the Lollards themselves did not hesitate to avail themselves of these conveniences and recreations without Scriptural warrant.

In his argument in defence of images, Pecock, while wholly disclaiming their adoration, regards them as a means of impressing the mind with the truths of religion in a more lively manner than is possible by means of books.

> 'In beholding,' he says, 'by sight of eyes upon many diverse images in the Church, a man shall in a little while be reminded now upon the passion of St. Laurence, and now anon afterwards upon the passion of St. Stephen, now anon afterwards upon the passion of Peter.'

His defence of pilgrimages follows the same lines. They have a reminding value. They serve to bring departed saints very near to us and to stimulate us to follow their good examples. In answer to the Lollard argument that if monastic houses were really profitable to Christian people, Christ Himself would have established them, Pecock inquires, 'Why ordained and made

ot Christ to us who shall be Mayor of London next year? Why ade not God gowns and coats, hosen and shoes to men, bread nd potages, and ale and wine since these things be so necessary o men that they may not lack them?' Pecock's reply to the ollard question is therefore that God has given men 'sensitive it,' which, in the things of this world, provides for their ordinary eeds. It is to the application of this 'sensitive wit' to religious equirements that we owe the foundation of religious houses.

The above are a few specimens of Pecock's arguments, and, whatever effect he may have produced on his Lollard friends, a man 'of his infinite variety,' which 'custom could not stale,' certainly gave both them and others a good deal over which to onder. He is happy in his illustration of evils brought about by the 'diverse opinions' of private and individual interpreters of Scripture. All the world, he says, if this method were adopted, would join together in keeping their service to God as dogs do n a market where each of them teareth the other's coat.'

Pecock was of opinion that preachers should be well trained n logic, philosophy, and divinity. Unless this was the case, the aity lay at the mercy of fluent but ignorant expositors of the faith.

> 'Certes,' he says, 'have men and women come to me and said, "Thus hath this famous preacher preached and thus hath that famous preacher preached," and I have answered them thus: Though he and he and he have so taught and preached it is not true, but it is untrue, and needs must be untrue and may be showed and proved undoubtedly to be untrue.'

Pecock in these observations was referring to the friars, whom he elsewhere described as 'pulpit bawlers.' They returned his hostility with interest.

In 1456, Pecock published *A Treatise of Faith*. This is a dialogue written, like *The Repressor*, in English for the benefit of the Lollards. In this treatise, which had much to do with sealing his fate, Pecock maintains, almost in anticipation of Butler, that faith is 'only probable, or opinional, not sciential.' Pecock also by implication gravely discounts the authority of General Councils and states, in opposition to current teaching which exalted the Church and the clergy at the expense of Scripture, that the latter is the ground and 'foundment of our Chris-

tian general faith.' In this book he is believed to have published a new and long variation of the Apostles' Creed, in which the descent into hell was omitted as an unauthorized interpolation.

Pecock, though acting with the highest motives, accentuated by this work the suspicions of his unorthodoxy which were already strong. His firm stand on the principle that natural religion is the true ground of all religion made him enemies. His placing Scripture above the authoritative decrees of Councils was regarded as another cardinal error and made him more enemies.

'Had he not,' men muttered, 'even in the presence of the Archbishop, when opposing divines were quoting the Fathers against him, exclaimed, "Pooh! you are just as good teachers as they and may just as well quote yourselves."' Was it not notorious that he had said of the Fathers, 'my soul loatheth this light food.' Had he not declared that the Apostles' Creed was not composed by the Apostles? Had he not denied the truth of the descent into hell?

The fact that Pecock, while expressing belief in the Holy Catholic Church, had asserted that it was fallible, was another item of the counts against him.

The pulpit of St. Paul's Cross and those of the Universities rang with the voices of doctors and heads of colleges denouncing Pecock and his opinions. A year later Pecock was described by the Abbot of St. Albans as 'the most impious intoxicator who had imbibed the spirit of perfidiousness that he might infectiously inform the simple people in their faith.' The same elegant penman described Pecock as 'that horrible monster which the Church of England produced by a miscarriage.'

While Pecock was thus surrounded and closed in by enemies, he had lost his best and ablest supporters by the murders of Ayscough, Bishop of Salisbury; and Moleyns, Bishop of Chichester, Pecock's predecessor in that see. He was soon to stand alone, with no man to help him in his piteous case.

Pecock had plainly expressed in *The Repressor* his hostility to the protracted war with France which had brought nothing but evil to the country. In 1457 Pecock sent a letter to Canning, the Lord Mayor of London, in which he seemed to favour a change of allegiance and a rising against the Government. Pecock, in fact, showed Yorkist tendencies. Canning passed on

the letter to King Henry VI, who showed it to his advisers, with the result that on October 22nd, 1457, the temporal lords present in the royal council demanded the expulsion of Pecock from among them. Moreover, his theological opinions were denounced. The political charge at once fell out of sight and the clergy present pressed the Archbishop to cite Pecock before him. Thereupon the Archbishop ordered Pecock's appearance and instructed him to bring with him nine of his more recent books for examination.

Archbishop Stafford had died and had been followed to the grave by Kemp, who held office for two years only. Bourchier, the Primate appealed to, was an episcopal 'Vicar of Bray,' who during his ten years' tenure of the see of Ely, had said Mass in his cathedral but once. He supported the Lancastrian and Yorkist dynasties in turn and was a conspicuous figure at Court, in fashionable assemblies and on the hunting-field. He was assuredly one of 'the children of this world.' Such was the man before whom Pecock had to appear. He brought with him his books, which Bourchier handed to twenty-four doctors for examination. Their report declared that Pecock's books abounded in heretical opinions. Pecock is believed to have been subjected to many examinations before his retractation of some of his opinions on November 21st. A week later he came before the Archbishop and bishops, doctors of theology and several influential laymen. After various questionings and answers, the Archbishop proceeded to inform Pecock that heresies had been proved against him. These heresies consisted in his denials of the descent into hell, of the authority of the Catholic Church, of the infallibility of General Councils. He also had been guilty of interpreting Scripture otherwise than the meaning of the Holy Spirit required. The Archbishop concluded his judgment by informing his 'dear brother Reginald' that he must make an immediate choice between abjuring his errors or becoming 'fuel for the burning.' Pecock, who for some weeks had been in a state of acute mental anxiety and was utterly cowed and broken, seems to have been dumbfounded when he heard the terrible alternative. He stood silent for a few moments. He saw no one before him but enemies, and no prospect but death or ruin. He chose the latter and then and there made an oral abjuration.

Pecock may not have chosen the worthier course. Like Cranmer, he shrank from the terror of the flames. Nor is he to be blamed, for, as Sir Thomas Browne remarks, 'It is not in the power of every honest faith to proceed thus far or to pass to heaven through the flames.'

On December 4th, 1457, which day was both the Feast of St. Barbara and the second Sunday in Advent, an immense crowd of no less than twenty thousand sightseers assembled at St. Paul's Cross to witness Pecock's humiliation. He arrived, wearing his episcopal robes, and with him were the Primate, three bishops and many other clergy. Kneeling before the bishops and describing himself as 'a miserable sinner who had heretofore walked in darkness,' he read his recantation. In this document, as Capes truly says, he was made to recant 'heresies of which he does not seem to have been guilty.' It may perhaps be more precisely stated that some of the 'heresies' were rather inferences from Pecock's statements than direct expressions of his personal opinions.

When Pecock had ended his wretched task, he handed three folios and eleven quartos of his works to the executioner, who threw them into the flames. While the fruit of his thought and diligence thus blazed before his eyes, Pecock exclaimed: 'My pride and presumption have brought on me these troubles.'

The University of Oxford, of which Pecock was the most distinguished member, went in solemn procession to Carfax, where four roads met. There all the copies of Pecock's works which could be found were burnt. The bishops endeavoured to sweep their dioceses clean of heresy by demanding delivery of his books.

In the meantime, Pecock was sent as the prisoner of the Archbishop to Maidstone. When, after an interval of four months, the sentence of deprivation of his see was pronounced against him, he tried the last resource of requesting bulls of restitution from the Pope. Probably he based his appeal on the ground that his deprivation was uncanonical, inasmuch as he had abjured his 'heresies.'

Although the bulls were obtained, this effort was frustrated by the King and his advisers, who made it clear to Pecock that,

he persisted in attempting to use the bulls, he would find no ace for repentance.

The Archbishop seems to have been resolved that Pecock hould never again have the opportunity of writing to the Pope or anyone else, nor of study, nor of recreation. He was sent to horney Abbey and placed in the custody of the Abbot. He ved alone in 'a secret close chamber,' possessing a squint from hich he could watch the service of Mass. He was allowed to ee no one without leave, save 'the sad person who made his re and bed.' All literature was forbidden except a breviary, a salter, a legend and a Bible. Neither pen nor ink might find eir way into his dismal apartment. To a man of Pecock's disosition the stone walls within which he lived could have been o hermitage. On the contrary, they must have made a prison ore intolerable than death, and he must have wished that he ad held 'shaking hands in the fire.' We hear no more of him fter his imprisonment. It is to be hoped that his spirit soon took ing and found rest.

It is impossible not to feel sorrow for Pecock. The 'pressure of conscience' applied by his enemies both to him and to he Lollards was, to use Bacon's words, 'to set out of the barque f the Christian Church the flag of a barque of pirates and assassins.' Pecock was an earnest seeker after truth, utterly disbelieving, as he says, 'that Christ would give a faith to his people and would not allow His faith to be at the full tried and lurst not acknowledge His faith to be so pure and refined from alsehood that it could not by strength of evidence be overcome.'

Pecock was regarded by the obscurantists of his day as one carried about with diverse and strange doctrines.' He was to a ruer judgment a forerunner of Erasmus and Colet. He loved nd gallantly defended the Church and its institutions; but desired that they should be without spot, or blemish or any such hing. He attacked no vital doctrine and was the friend of all hings 'true, honourable, and of good report.' He was made a gazing-stock by reproaches and afflictions': yet no graver charge can be made against him than the belief that 'it is a great part of true religion not to pretend to know more than we do.'

H. P. Palmer.

BARTHIANISM AND MODERNISM

THE *Dialectic Theology* with which the name of Karl Barth is identified owes much of its vogue to the circumstances under which it came into prominence. It was not born of the War, but the conditions in which Germany was involved after the War provided a suitable soil for its propagation. It has been called by one of its admirers a Desperado Theology, and as such it was congenial to the post-War despair of Germany. 'Barth's theology,' says H. Gressmann, 'is not Christian, or at the very most is only semi-Christian. It is derived from 4 *Esdras* and is characteristic of a period of collapse and inflation.' Another German theologian, August Pauli, has recently drawn a frank picture of the effect of the German defeat on German theology:

> 'The War ended in complete collapse, external and internal, and in that collapse were involved the Church and its Theology, at any rate the Protestant Church and Protestant Theology. They were, in fact, inseparable from the interests of the nation in arms. With these interests they had been identified. To these interests they had been subordinated. Everything else had been pushed into the background in devotion to the duty of national defence. A temporary suspension of the Sermon on the Mount had been permitted, even demanded. Finally came collapse, political and military. Under the strain of long and arduous warfare the nation had lost its bearings. Ideals were confused. Any kind of firm foothold had disappeared. In the collapse was involved the Church, which had so long preached the German God and, with it, its theology.'

But this was not all. As German theology during the War had been identified with the national interests, so, long prior to the War, it had been intimately associated with contemporary European culture and civilization. Now, to a German the downfall of Germany suggested the downfall of European culture. The pre-War theologian had held fast to the ideal of a religion which should be the soul of Christian civilization. When, as during the period of post-War disillusionment, all the values of civilization were called in question, this ideal was emptied of meaning. Thus it happened that when Barth came with his proclamation of the devaluation of all earthly values, he found many ready hearers. He offered a way of escape from a discredited connection. He presented the divine plane as in a dimension

sparate from the plane of history. Between the world of time nd eternity there is, according to him, an unbridgable gulf. ime is the negation of eternity. Of the heavenly realm he ys, 'There can be no encroachment of man on that Kingdom nd no projection of that Kingdom into this world.' He preached radical dualism with a passion which elicited a quick response om disillusioned men.

The difficulties inherent to this dualism are obvious. The rimary difficulty is the difficulty of conceiving even the possiility of any contact between worlds which the presuppositions f the theologian have so drastically separated, the world of God nd this derelict existential world of man. Barth postulates an unbridgable gulf' between the two. How can the unbridgable e bridged? Barth does not propound any real solution of this roblem. He cuts the knot by introducing the conception of niracle. Revelation is a 'vertical miracle.' It is here that the ialectic of his theology differs from the dialectic of logic. ogical dialectic resolves thesis and antithesis in synthesis. Barth states thesis and antithesis in the form of paradox and then rashes in with miracle. To his paradoxical dualism we owe the trange geometrical Christology of his *Epistle to the Romans* ccording to which in the Resurrection of Jesus Christ the new orld of the Holy Spirit touches the old world 'as the tangent ouches the circle without touching it.' Thus he tries to secure ontact between the two worlds without postulating any measurble degree of coincidence. But Barth's *Epistle to the Romans* s primarily the manifesto of a prophet and only secondarily the reatise of a theologian. It is aglow with fire. Unfortunately for he critical student the fire is accompanied by voluminous smoke, nd at the crucial points the student is apt to be baffled by a very moke-screen of passionate rhetoric. It is in his *Prolegomena o Dogmatics* published in 1927 that we really get to close grips vith Barth as a systematic theologian. Of this book Bernhard Dörries says :

> The *Epistle to the Romans* was, as it were, the volcanic eruption of an intense moral and spiritual experience. We now see the selfsame lava which was then thrown out, but it has fused into itself some of the matter which it encountered on its outward flow. The glowing mass is becoming solidified. Here and there something of the old fire breaks forth anew, but in the process of petrefaction the original glow has in large measure disappeared.

The change is not only a change of tone. There is a change in emphasis and balance. It is difficult to imagine the earlier Barth saying as Barth now says, that '*Deus = Deus loquens*,' or that God is *Deus Revelatus*. The harshness of his fundamental antitheses has been toned down. But, when we have said this, we have said all. The modifications are so hedged round by elaborate clauses that in substance they amount to little. Fundamentally his position remains unaltered, little affected by the intricate web of argumentation in which its presentation is now involved.

Barth bases his dogmatic system on the fact of external revelation. This he assumes as his *datum*. It is a definite perceptible fact. '"*Es predigt*" *in der Welt, so gewiss und so wahrnehmbar als* "*es regnet.*"' This parallel between the proclamation of the Divine Word and the falling rain is reminiscent of his earlier description of Revelation as 'vertical miracle.' It is with the bare fact, the formal concept of Revelation, that he is concerned. He warns the historian, the psychologist, the logician off his ground as trespassers. They must not lay their 'cuckoos' eggs' within the sphere of Barthian theology. Let them confine their activities within their proper scope, the derelict existential human plane! The necessary result of Barth's devaluation of all human ideals, human aspiration, human thought, is that his system of theology is highly abstract. He is bound by his fundamental principle to bar the road which leads to the Creator through His creation. Whether or not there exists an 'unbridgable gulf' between Time and Eternity, there is certainly an unbridgable gulf between Barthianism and Modernism, at any rate as we know Modernism in England. Dr. Rashdall fairly represents the position of English Modernism when he says that

> 'All modern philosophers who recognise that the knowledge of God is possible are agreed that we can only attain such knowledge of Him in the light of the human mind at its highest.'

He himself postulates 'a certain community of nature between God and man,' and believes that 'in all true human thinking there is a reproduction of the Divine thought, and above all that in the highest ideals which the human conscience recognizes there is a revelation of the ideal eternally present in the Divine Mind.' Such a position as this is the antithesis of Barthianism. It is anathema to Barth. It represents a type of theological

thought which he dismisses with rather arrogant contempt as 'a grandiose illusion of romantic philosophers.'

God is essentially Subject. Hence it is impossible to approach Him from the human side, for by so doing we make of Him an Object. Arguing thus Barth starts from the bare phrase *Deus dixit* or its equivalent, 'God reveals Himself.' 'Whatever answer we give to the question of the Subject, Predicate, and Object of this sentence,' he says, 'with that answer we enter inevitably, whether knowingly or unknowingly, into the realm of the doctrine of the Trinity.' From an analysis of the sentence 'God reveals Himself' which, as Professor Siegfried points out in his recent book, *The Theology of the Word according to Barth*, is the barest grammatical analysis, Barth deduces the doctrine of the Trinity. He hypostasizes the elements of a grammatical analysis. God is Revealer; He is Revelation, He is the Thing Revealed. Hence the Trinity. Barth is driven to such arid abstraction because he empties reality as we know it of all content. In Professor Siegfried's judgment he might as well argue that because a man can say 'I show myself,' because he is the person who shows and the person who is shown, therefore all men are trinitarian beings. In expounding his argument Barth quotes freely from mediaeval scholasticism, but in fact the Schoolmen did not move in a world of abstraction nearly as strenuous as that to which Barth introduces his readers. S. Thomas Aquinas, for example, conceives the *verbum* as *emanatio intelligibilis*. The Word with which Barth starts is 'what is spoken,' a *flatus vocis*. Professor Siegfried characterizes the hypostasization of the Word so conceived as sheer nonsense (*Ungedanke*).

He aptly sums up Barth's theory of Revelation in two phrases —'The Magic of the Word' and 'The Sacramentalism of the Word.' An interesting parallel might well be drawn between the relationship of the Word to its human expression and the relationship between the Sacramental Substance and the consecrated Elements in the Lutheran theory of Consubstantiation. Notably striking is this parallel in Barth's exposition of the function of preaching. Preaching is Revelation at the second remove. In its first form the Word of God is the Self-revelation. We perceive it in a second form as mirrored in Holy Writ. With its 'ground, norm, and criterion' in Holy Writ, it becomes in its

third form Christian preaching. But Christian preaching of necessity lies within the 'brackets' which enclose the utterly 'questionable' world of human existence. At the very best it is therefore but 'a human word, a human attempt to speak of God as its theme. This attempt must fail.' Even when we are effective vehicles of the Divine Word 'we are liars.' Preaching is a work of man, and Barthian dualism separates the work of man from the activity of God by an unbridgable gulf. It is as an alien substance that the Word bridges the unbridgable. To quote Professor Siegfried again, Barth 'ends with the magic of the Divine Word. As a magic fluid it operates through the wizardry of preaching.' Barth is compelled by his presuppositions to ignore what the Modernist values as partial or relative truth. The Modernist believes that even 'instincts immature,' 'purposes unsure,' may be the fruit of the activity of the Holy Spirit. Barth says explicitly, 'The truth which really is *a Spiritu sancto* cannot then be a partial truth. It is either the whole truth, or it is not Revelation.' This divorce of religious truth from concrete existence endows Barth's primary conception of the Word with a formal character. It must be by its nature a kind of x, an unknown quantity introduced from outside. Barth fabricates an *a priori* conception of the Word and then strives to force reality into the mould of his mental construction.

But we live and move and have our being in a world of concrete existence. It is not enough to picture this world, as Barth does, as a vacuum (*Hohlraum*) into which the x, the magic fluid of the Word is poured through a 'vertical miracle' or as falling rain. The interest of the *Prolegomena* lies mainly in the attempt to give some meaning to history without entirely abandoning the theological conception of the *Hohlraum*.

The Word is to Karl Barth the Absolute and Unconditioned. But nevertheless it is mediated through Holy Scripture. 'The line which links the Church with Revelation is not a straight line, but a broken line, broken by reason of its indirect passage by way of the Bible.' This indirectness of Revelation would seem necessarily to involve the view that Scripture is relative to the Word; but in fact Barth proceeds to attribute to Scripture in certain respects the absolute character of the Word of which it is the vehicle. It is only by so doing that he can give any con-

nt to the *x* of the Word. For instance, he infers from the abso- te character of the Word that in the actual concrete Scripture ere can be no development. 'Every part of Scripture is in elf the perfect Word of God.' Hence he is bound to affirm, as does, that 'between the Old and New Testaments and also tween individual writings in the one or the other of the Testaents no fundamental distinction can be made.' He pours orn on Luther's view that Scripture is the Word of God so far it expresses Christ. This he characterizes as an attempt 'to range a kind of selective Bible.' 'Only a profane thought hich confuses the significance of the Incarnation with the so- lled rise of Christianity would, because it is the witness of a rior era, ascribe to the Old Testament a lesser dignity than that f the New Testament, or to the witness and baptism of John a sser dignity than that of the witness and baptism of the postles.' In fact he fills ten pages of his book with reiterated nd emphatic assertion of the essential identity of Old Testaent and New Testament. All this proceeds from his ascription Old and New Testament alike of the absolute character of evelation. 'Every part of Scripture is in itself the perfect Vord of God.' What has happened is that from the bare *Deus ixit* Barth has constructed an abstract formal concept of the Vord of God and then with this concept has equated the conrete Scriptures to such an extent that he is now able to transfer them the attributes of his mental construction. Yet at the ame time he does not shrink from the admission that from ne point of view of the historian the Word in Scripture is the ord of apostles and prophets and, as such, 'shares in the reativity, the ambiguity, the remoteness which are common to verything historical.' Here, at another stage of his thought, ts ineradicable dualism emerges.

He attempts to resolve this dualism by recourse to the conception of *Urgeschichte*. This term he borrows from Overbeck, who used it in a natural meaning to indicate *the actual history which lies behind the documents* of the New Testament. Barth, however, uses the word in another sense, a characteristically Barthian sense. It is *history as seen in the light of Divine Revelation*. 'It is clear,' he says, 'that *Urgeschichte* understood in his way is not a conception appropriate to scientific history; it

is a theological, a dogmatic conception.' It is on the plane of this Barthian history that the Incarnation takes place. 'We describe the Incarnation of the Word, the Revelation of God in Jesus Christ as an event appertaining to *Urgeschichte*.'

It might seem that with the reference to Jesus, Barth was somewhere near a firm footing on the ground of ordinary history; but Jesus Christ is to Barth essentially the symbol of Incarnation, and it is only a delusion of 'profane thought' to confuse the significance of the Incarnation with the 'so-called rise of Christianity.' Seeing that every part of Scripture is in itself the perfect Word of God and that Incarnation is the Revelation of God, the Incarnation, according to Barth, must needs be present in the Old Testament. The next step is to find a definition of Incarnation which is consistent with his thesis that between the Old and New Testaments the distinction is only temporal. This he does by defining Incarnation as the 'intercourse of God through law and barrier.' Thus he succeeds in firmly establishing the Incarnation in the Old Testament, but he only does so by giving to Incarnation a Barthian meaning, by constructing a kind of pseudo-incarnation.

The Revelation of God *happens* in the Scriptures.

> 'The Revelation is, nay, it happens in the Scriptures, not behind them. It happens—there is no getting away from it—in the biblical texts, in the words and the sentences, in that which the prophets and apostles would say and have said as its witnesses.'

But Barth is not a Biblical Fundamentalist. Without any reserve he grants the historical critic the right to strive to get behind the documentary sources to the facts, or even to construct 'those hazy sketches which are somewhat optimistically entitled *The Life of Jesus*.' Perhaps, as Revelation *happens* in the texts and not behind them, the results of historical criticism are of no particular importance. If, moreover, there is any sense in ascribing a date in time to the 'theological and dogmatic' conception of *Urgeschichte* it would seem to 'profane thought' that it might be dated within the period of the composition of the Biblical writings wherein the Revelation happens, or perhaps, though on the principle of the equal value of Old and New Testament this would be doubtful, within the period of the composition of the books of the New Testament, say, A.D. 60—

p. 120. But, after saying that Revelation happens in the text and ot behind it, Barth does quite definitely go behind the text and scribes as the 'period of Revelation' the years A.D. 1—A.D. 30, period long prior to the composition of the New Testament oup of the writings in which and *not* behind which the Revelaon happens. It is clear that Barth is here vacillating, as he conntly does, between two inconsistent conceptions. By specifyg the period A.D. 1—A.D. 30 he has gone back for the moment the plane of profane history. If the reader, not without some tonishment, is prepared to follow him, what will he find? His ide assures him that possibly he will only find as the fruit of s journey banality or myth. 'The historical event as such is nbiguous, and remains ambiguous. It may even be, as such, nality or myth.' Here again Barthian dualism emerges, now tween *Urgeschichte*, the sphere of Divine Revelation, and istory, the realm of banality and myth. *Urgeschichte* is a kind Docetic History with nothing very certain or definite behind . 'Within the sphere of the History of the historian Barth aims freedom to accept the most radical results of negative iticism, even the criticism of such men as D. Fr. Strauss, rthur Drews, and R. Bultmann, whom he mentions by name.

When he discusses the Incarnation in Jesus Christ, Barth is early bound to take his stand on the plane of *Urgeschichte*. He says that if we try to grasp after 'the human figure' of Jesus s such in the same way that we grasp 'the reality of all other henomena and history,' we shall find that we are only clutching t 'emptiness.' The reason is that 'only in His unity with the Word of God spoken to us and *received* by us *is* this Man, does his Man *exist*.'* 'His humanity is but the predicate of His ivinity.' Yet the Incarnate Son of God 'exists in time, in the nity of body and soul, as an Individual.' An existence in time hich depends not only on the utterance of the Word of God ut also on its reception by us, is surely a strange kind of existnce; but Barth assures us that apart from such reception we rope only into emptiness. Thus Barth's original dualism, with s accompanying deprecation of the existential, leads ultimately o a strongly docetic Christology. The unbridgable gulf has not een bridged. At most it only seems to have been bridged.

* The italics are not in the original.

Barth affirms that the Divine Revelation *happens* in Scripture. So it is naturally to Scripture that he turns when establishing the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ. He is ready to admit that the historical reality behind may be only banality or myth. As his *terminus a quo* he takes the Gospel narrative of the Virgin-Birth. Obviously an event so exceptional as a virgin-birth can hardly be described as a banality. It may, however, be a myth, and it is as a myth that Barth accepts it. 'We know not what we say if we call the miracle truth unless we have first called it myth.' Yet, though a myth, the Virgin-Birth is, by virtue of the 'spoken and received Word of God,' an event of *Urgeschichte*. Barth defines myth as something which is 'only in fantasy an actual historical event,' and then, ignoring the very real difference between a myth which is known to be mythical and a myth which is regarded as a historical event, he proceeds to treat the Virgin-Birth in a way singularly inappropriate except on the assumption that it is historical. He distinguishes three elements, (1) the *formatio ex semine et sanguine Mariae virginis*, (2) the *sanctificatio* through which 'this particle of human nature by the mighty action of the Spirit is singled out of the mass of the flesh for the purpose of being the God-Man,' and (3) the *assumptio* itself whereby 'in the same moment, again through the agency of the Spirit, the Divine Word . . . takes possession of the particle, becomes Subject of this Predicate . . . . ' Surely this gynaecological particularity is singularly inappropriate to the sphere of *Urgeschichte*!

Barth's treatment of the Virgin-Birth well illustrates three outstanding characteristics of his system and his method—his pseudo-orthodoxy, his dexterity in transferring ideas, appropriate to one plane, from that plane to another to which they are inappropriate, a dexterity which can only be fitly described as sleight-of-hand, and a dry intellectualism which alternates with *sacrificium intellectus*. Of his rationalistic treatment of the myth or *urgeschichtlich* event of the Virgin-Birth Dörries says:

> 'As Barth distils his God-Man—I am conscious that it is a hard thing to say, but it must be said—it is no real man, no man 'like us' no, it is a *homunculus*, a retort-man fabricated in the laboratory of human reasoning and calculation.'

Barth starts from a radical dualism, and in his *Prolegomena*

en with the introduction of the conception of *Urgeschichte*, only resolves that dualism in appearance. Behind the veil hich he weaves by his subtle manipulation of the elements of s problem there still persists the fundamental divorce between ith and 'the totality of human existence' with which he started. hen faith is thus divorced from concrete existence it ceases to trustworthy. Barth is much addicted to quoting from mediae- l Scholasticism; but Schleiermacher, against whom much of s polemic is directed, has much more right to claim affinity th the Schoolmen than has Barth. To quote Professor Sieg- ied again:

> 'Schleiermacher and Thomas are in fact commensurable quantities, though the analogy has only a relative validity. They set out from the same starting-point, the philosophic problem of the world-structure on which the phenomenon of religion is manifested. The standpoint of Barth is neither that of Schleiermacher nor that of Thomas, for Barth starts by isolating faith from world-knowledge.'

o doubt the combination of a certain romanticism with a theo- gical rationalism and a dialectical skill in the manipulation of ostractions which characterizes the formulation of Barth's stem is in its way impressive. He has something of the fas- nation of the hypnotist. But, before surrendering to his spell, is well to face squarely three of fifteen searching questions ropounded by Harnack some seven years ago in *Die Christ- che Welt*:

> 'If sin is nothing else than lack of reverence and love, how can we remedy that lack save through the proclamation of God's holy majesty and God's love? How can we venture with this message to mingle all manner of paradoxes and velleities?'
>
> 'If God and World . . . are simply contraries, how are we to understand the close relation, the equation indeed, of love of God and love of neighbour which is the heart of the Gospel? And how is it possible to equate the two unless we attach a lofty value to morality?'
>
> 'If the exhortation still holds good, "Whatsoever things are honourable, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things," how dare we erect barriers between God and the good, the beautiful and the true?'

G. L. H. Harvey.

BOOK REVIEWS

MIRACLE IN CHRISTIAN APOLOGETIC*

Of Mr. Wright's *Miracle in History and Modern Thought*, or *Miracle and Christian Apologetic*, the sub-title is more truly descriptive than the title. Mr. Wright's purpose is not to give a survey of the history of the idea of miracle; nor does he systematically examine past controversies on the subject and, having noted the residual problems, address himself to their solution. His work has two parts. In Part I he first outlines his conception of the present state of questions concerning the miraculous. He argues that it results from a two-fold tendency, of which one aspect is the movement away from what he calls 'evidential supernaturalism,' the other being the increasing 'philosophizing' of Christianity during the nineteenth century. He also prints a number of definitions of miracle, which reveal such confusion that it is necessary to return 'to those basal questions from which definitions spring.' There follow chapters on Historical Science, Natural Science and Psychical Science in relation to Miracle. Each chapter reveals wide and careful reading and much sound judgment. The whole discussion of the methods and tests of science is well balanced. Few will nowadays deny that historical criticism is justified in approaching miracle-stories in general with scepticism. Mr. Wright offers abundant justification of this attitude, but at the same time insists that the final word does not rest with historical criticism. Nor, if there have been or are actual events called 'miracles,' can natural science 'reject them wholesale on *à priori* grounds as unhistorical,' any more than metaphysics, on the same grounds, can say that a particular event *must* have happened. Mr. Wright sums up this aspect of the discussion thus:

> 'For neither science nor history can be always quite certain as to what is the fact-basis of every alleged event. Sometimes these studies may justifiably say: The consensus of probability is that the alleged event did not happen. Sometimes they may justifiably say: something unusual probably happened, but not the something which is alleged. But sometimes they have unjustifiably said: This alleged event did not happen, when subsequent scientific and historic researches have led to the conclusion that it very probably *did* happen' (p. 124).

Also, the modern study of personality shows that 'there are forces, undreamt of in the past, which make many 'impossibilities' possible: but Mr. Wright does well to emphasise in a very wise and necessary passage:

> 'We may not buttress up an argument for miracles with modern psychical facts and studies, without at the same time applying these same facts and studies to our view of miracles. We must set forth with precision that 'miracles' are, if established by these studies, shown to be not contrary to Nature, and not impossible of descriptive or scientific explanation' (p. 169).

It will be seen that Mr. Wright makes clear the truth that the progress of scientific studies has shown that many events which in the past would have been and were ascribed to the miraculous intervention of God, no longer *require* that hypothesis to explain their occurrence. This does not prove that past 'miracles' were not so wrought, but it destroys the *logical*

* *Miracle in History and Modern Thought.* By C. J. Wright, B.D. (Constable & Co. Price 18/- net.)

ind for asserting that they were. In short, since testimony to fact not reach to the intervening Divine agency, the said events afford no ible proof of such intervening agency. Hence 'miraculous' events evidentially worthless. They are at best corroborative. The essential ulates of a religion must already be accepted as true before alleged racles' can afford evidence of any kind of activity on the part of its . The limitations of science on the one hand, and its actual progress the other, respectively destroy such dogmatism as 'miracles are im-sible' and the certainty that any alleged event is a miracle.

What Mr. Wright says of ecclesiastical miracles is true of all. The nan Catholic approaches them by the way of 'antecedent probability,' ers by the way of 'antecedent improbability.' Which of these ante-ents is the *more* probable? The difference between them is that the er has an empirical basis, while the other has not, but is essentially riori. Like all *à priori* approaches to the study of fact, it may be en-ly self-consistent and entirely lacking in contact with fact. The only d theory is one which finds its problem in fact, returns to fact to test solution of the problem, and which in reaching its solution must have t in touch with fact in order to maintain the continuity in which ex-nation consists.

Part I of Mr. Wright's book closes with a discussion of 'The Idea of d and the Miraculous,' in which he claims to face ultimate issues. Part s an application of the principles claimed to have been attained in Part o 'The Gospel Miracles.' There are special chapters on 'The Resur-tion of Christ and Miracle' and 'The Person of Christ and the Miracu-s.' The value of Mr. Wright's work lies in his comprehensive and dite presentation of the ideas and arguments of his predecessors rather n in original contributions. The student will be very grateful for the nty pages of Appendix to Chapter vi, which sets out carefully the difications and additions made by the Evangelists to miracle-stories in ir sources, so far as these are known. There is also an excellent biblio-phy. In a technical book of over four hundred pages it is a serious ission that there are neither synopses of chapter-contents nor a full ject-index.

The theologically vital section of the book is that of eighty pages which ses Part I. It is called 'The Idea of God and the Miraculous,' and Mr. right adds an Appendix of twenty pages in which he examines the ition of Dr. F. R. Tennant, with subsidiary reference to Baden Powell, zley and Wendland. This treatment of the fundamental issues is the st systematic and the least satisfying part of the book. It contains many te observations and good summaries and brief criticisms of Materialism, theism and Deism, and expositions of the ideas of Transcendence and manence, and of Theism as the attempt so to combine them as to escape ism on the one hand and Pantheism on the other. But, in regard to main subject of the book, what is the upshot of it all?

Mr. Wright's contention is that the underlying idea in the old concept the miraculous is essential and true. 'God acts *immediately* in His rld. But this immediacy of Divine action does not mean the lack of nomenal antecedents. It means the use of such to accomplish *immediate* ls in the mind and heart of God.' It is not that there are no 'secondary ses,' but that God is immediately active in *all* 'natural causation.' This, holds, is the only basis for a 'worthy, constructive doctrine of miracle.' e fault in traditional miracle apologetic was that it only maintained s position half-heartedly: it must be maintained 'persistently' and 'con-tently,' whereon 'many, if not most, of the difficulties in regard to the

miraculous would disappear.' 'The natural,' says Mr. Wright, 'is the supernatural mode of working': what we call Nature is a manifestation of God's activities. 'We may only speak of His "interferences" (ambiguous word) if He is "interfering" all the time.'

This position is open to serious criticism. If every event in Nature—which, of course, includes man and his doings—is *immediately* caused by God, all secondary causes being only the means of His direct operation, certain conclusions are inevitable. First, there is an end of human freedom. It is God that worketh in us, not only to do good, but in everything that we do. Secondly, all attempts to grapple with the problem of evil are utterly hopeless. If all the pains and evils of the world are directly caused by God there is no possible escape from the alternative conclusions that either pain and evil are illusory, or else that evil as well as good is characteristic of God's nature. Mr. Wright does not appear to recognise these difficulties involved in his solution of the problem. He repudiates Pantheism to assert it in another form. He retains the *idea* of the supernatural only because he steals as its only intelligible content what, on the older dualism, was the content of the natural. For Mr. Wright, the 'natural' is no more than a name for an inert medium of the direct Divine activity. It has no real causation in itself, not even a derived or delegated causation. Mr. Wright speaks very hopefully of a philosophical theism which will 'reconcile' certain 'dualities of experience'—'the natural and supernatural . . . good and evil, God and man.' When his own 'reconciliation' makes the natural simply the mode of the supernatural one wonders whether, should he turn his attention to the problem, he will 'reconcile' good and evil by making evil the mode of the good!

Mr. Wright can say, 'But what in the interests of theism *has* to be maintained is that the term "supernatural" is not to be used as equivalent to the term "natural."' Yet he proceeds to repudiate all attempts—such as those of Dr. Tennant—to maintain both supernatural causation and natural causation. He argues that no justification for the distinction exists except of the *à priori* kind necessary to maintain the concept of miracle—in other words it is an assumption waiting for evidence to justify it, which is not forthcoming. But Mr. Wright himself distinguishes between miracle as *fact* and the miraculous or supernatural *idea*. In what respects does his *idea* with no justifying *fact* differ from Dr. Tennant's supposed supernatural causation with no instances thereof? Mr. Wright describes Dr. Tennant's distinction as 'involving necessarily two different, mutually exclusive types of phenomena.' He either ignores or has strangely failed to notice Dr. Tennant's emphasis and illustrations that it need involve nothing of the kind. Dr. Tennant is at pains to show that he conceives supernatural causation to be possible precisely in the sense in which Mr. Wright sees it everywhere—namely, as being such as would in no way put science to confusion and such as science would not discover. It is not at all that Dr. Tennant asserts a supernatural causation which does not use natural means: it is that he believes there is a scheme of truly natural causes possessing a delegated autonomy of its own. In Dr. Tennant's view the laws of gravity, thermo-dynamics and other laws are real *causes*, and *not* merely instances of God's 'all-the-time-interferences' operating in order to produce a sequence which science merely describes, and any such interventions in or suspensions of their operation such as the old miraculous conception involved, would be destructive of the ordered cosmos which is necessary to the development of moral and spiritual life. On the other hand, the co-ordination of the several natural laws into a single ordered cosmos, their maintenance as such, and the fact that their main-

ous interactions and adaptations conspire to produce emergent or epi-etic evolution, suggests a Divine activity distinguishable from that vity which characterises the constant and unbroken operations of icular laws. In the same way man, by reason of his knowledge of r, and of his will to perform God's righteous will, can and does, with-any breach of natural laws, produce effects which otherwise those laws not produce. The real difference between Dr. Tennant and Mr. Wright cerns the natural rather than the supernatural. Dr. Tennant is not ious to assert a type of supernatural which Mr. Wright cannot admit, rather to give a real meaning to 'the natural' which Mr. Wright's osophy empties of its content.

Modern theology in its concern with miracle will do well to be content h the facts that miracles can never be known as such and that they are efore evidentially worthless and unnecessary. At the same time it st shun all attempts to harmonize the supernatural and the natural by uments which really involve either Deism or Pantheism; for each is tructive of Theism, and against them mere verbal repudiations are of avail.

J. S. Bezzant.

FAITH AND THE EMPTY TOMB.*

It is probable that no really convincing theory of what happened on the t Easter morning will ever be forthcoming. It has long been recognised difficult, if not impossible, to harmonize all the details of the Resurtion narratives: the only way to do so is to bend discordant evidence that it comes into line with the theory adopted. And, despite his sinity and the genuine desire to be fair, we believe that this is the method Mr. Shafto. His very readable little book, *The Reality of the Resurtion,* is a sustained argument in defence of the Resurrection as a funnental article of the Christian faith. With that conviction in itself we ree. But Mr. Shafto goes on to equate belief in the risen life of Jesus h belief in the Empty Tomb and to assert that one is essential to the ier. 'If that tomb was indeed empty we may see some light on the imate destiny of matter,' but 'if the survival of Jesus was simply that millions before and since, Death still reigns; its power is not broken' 97). (But what exactly it is which *survives* in this case, Mr. Shafto es not trouble to examine.) Paul, says Mr. Shafto, 'bluntly staked his th on this supreme issue' (p. 11). Of the Resurrection this is true; of Empty Tomb it is an exaggeration. Indeed, it is difficult to see how ul could have regarded the latter as a supreme issue, since, except for a ubtful implication from I *Cor.* xv, 3, he never refers to it; and, in spite the ingenious arguments which Mr. Shafto uses to reconcile I *Cor.* xv th *Luke* xxiv, 39, we still believe that Paul had a quite different conotion of the Resurrection body from that of Luke. 'The analogy of the wing of the seed (I *Cor.* xv),' says Mr. Shafto, 'presupposes that the ave is the state from which the Resurrection took place.' But, if we cept this interpretation of the analogy, may we not also accept literally e words which follow, 'That which thou sowest is not quickened except die, and that which thou sowest, thou sowest not the body which shall , but bare grain . . . ' which, we may continue, having shot forth its new e, itself remains in the earth?

We select two other points for criticism. Mr. Shafto quotes with disproval Canon Streeter's words relative to the Empty Tomb, that 'where natural explanation of the event is at all possible there must be very ecial reasons for falling back upon an explanation of a supernatural

* *The Reality of the Resurrection.* By G. R. H. Shafto. (S.C.M. pp. 100. 2/-.)

character.' But where the evidence becomes too much for Mr. Shafto, he proceeds to rationalise. Thus the 'two men in dazzling apparel' become two priests in their prescribed white garments, who were secret disciples. Now nothing else is known of these two important witnesses (except that they appear again providentially, for Mr. Shafto, at the Ascension). But supposing that we accept this suggestion. There were two men, then, at the Tomb before any of the known disciples arrived there, and it was they who informed the disciples that the body of Jesus was not there. In the absence of any evidence at all about these first visitors to the Tomb, is it not open to us to believe either of two theories—that they had seen the Risen Lord *or* that they themselves had removed the body for purposes known to themselves? We are not putting this forward as a theory but pointing out that, on Mr. Shafto's own hypothesis, his scorn of Canon Streeter's 'naturalistic explanation' is not justified.

And there is another *non sequitur.* The purpose of Paul's writing (I *Cor.* xv), says Mr. Shafto, 'was not to prove Christ's resurrection, but to prove *ours,* the proof being based upon the acknowledged fact of Christ's resurrection' (p. 73). We agree. But Mr. Shafto does not believe that our bodies are to rise from the grave, since he repudiates that belief. 'The most rudimentary knowledge of organic chemistry will suffice to compel us to dismiss that venerable tradition of the first eighteen centuries' (p. 80). How, then, can Christ's resurrection prove ours if His physical body saw no corruption and so was totally different from ours?

For ourselves, the Resurrection of Christ means the complete victory of His personality over death, with all that personality means and includes. And, to quote Mr. Shafto's own words, 'The one reality which gives continuity with the world beyond is personality' (p. 50). But we fail to see that there is any necessary connection between this and the Empty Tomb. However, we willingly acknowledge that this small book contains a skilful, though unconvincing, exposition of the traditional view. J.P.H.

LOCAL HISTORY.*

Nearly every one of the many parishes in England has a root in the past, a church, or a family, or a manor. It is one of the most pleasant and useful occupations to investigate the history of that local monument along some of the lines that are open such as topography or genealogy. Some who might be attracted by such an interest think they lack the necessary equipment or they do not know where to begin. The present volume is one of those that should be useful in the preparation of the local historian. Every student of English medieval life sooner or later turns to the Hundred Rolls, for the Hundred Rolls open the door to the understanding of the thirteenth century. Miss Cam has explained clearly, though not so fully as some might have wished, what the Hundred Rolls are, and some of the inferences they allow the historian to make; in fact she has given a lesson in the method of using the Rolls.

The subject she has chosen for this purpose is an account of the Sheriff and his officers. The Sheriff in Norman England was the King's agent in the shire, primarily in the administration of justice and finance. The Crown, however, was not satisfied to depend upon the loyalty of the Sheriff. Periodically it made independent investigations through local juries empanelled in the various parts of each shire—the 688 hundreds or wapentakes—and questioned on any matter on which the King required informa-

* *The Hundred and the Hundred Rolls.* By Helen M. Cam. The Antiquary's Books. (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1930. Price 15/-.)

. Inquiry might be made, for example, on such subjects as what nors had been alienated from the Crown, how far liberties (*i.e.* private sdiction like that of the religious orders) obstructed the common justice he King, what encroachments had been made on the King's right of ren, how far the Sheriffs performed their functions impartially, whether l had been exported illegally, whether religious orders had appropriated owsons from the Crown, and so forth.

Parts of several such inquests are preserved. The chief publication of n is that printed by the Record Commission in two folio volumes under title Rotuli Hundredorum. These are concerned mainly with the inst made by Edward I in 1274-5, but bits from several others are included. rmation is lacking for criticising the accuracy of these reports, but y must often have been untrustworthy. It was reported, for example t. Hund., I, 119), that the Templars held the Castle Mills at York with visible authority, when in actual fact they held the mills by Royal arter. Behind such reports it may be that we detect a certain animus inst the religious houses and other claimants to 'liberties.' The 'liberty' part of the subject upon which Miss Cam tells us less than we could h for. It would have been interesting, too, to hear her view of the sibility of criticising the reports themselves.

The book is completed with an adequate index and some useful appenes, particularly the fourth, which gives a complete list of the Hundreds h a modern spelling of their names. Sometimes the modernisation is an improvement. The Yorkshire Hundred of Halikeld might with vantage continue to be spelt so rather than Hallikeld, a form which obres the derivation—Holy Well. A glossary of technical terms would ve been useful for the beginner. E. J. MARTIN.

THE CONTROL OF VICE.*

Attempts to control the sexual habits of a community by legislation ve been incessant and undeterred by failure. The present volume is an nirable study of ecclesiastical and civil practice from the Anglo-Saxon iod down to the enactments which still prevail in America—that country compulsory and standardised virtue.

Its pages contain much interesting material, both for the historian, the dent of social habits, and for the student of human nature, which, ugh repellent when itself vicious, is still more so when it takes up the k of restraining the vices of others.

In mediaeval, and even in Tudor and Stuart times, the practice of ual immorality was wont to be an extremely expensive business. Fines an incredible size were imposed, and secured by bond, so that even a y moderate transgressor might find himself mulcted annually of a conerable sum. Public whipping also served as a deterrent. The zeal of Puritan legislators boiled higher even than that of their predecessors, d in 1650 adultery became a felony punishable by death, as it afterwards ame in Massachusetts. In England, however, the unwillingness of ies to convict enabled many transgressors to evade the rigour of the v. Prostitutes, however, were publicly whipped without mercy as late the reign of George III. William Blake wrote :—

> 'The harlot's cry from street to street
> Shall prove Old England's winding sheet.'

Mr. May has produced an admirable book which will well repay study.
J.C.H.

* *Social Control of Sex Expression.* By Geoffrey May. (Allen and Unwin, 1930. 12/6.)

THE UNIVERSAL QUEST.

Dr. Shaw, who is a professor in the Central Theological College, Tokyo, in his thesis* for the Oxford D.D., analyses and discusses the great religions of the world from the point of view of the bearing of each on human need and its satisfaction. Without laying down a 'minimum definition' of religion, he sees a common factor in the primitive and the advanced religious systems, namely the sense of being 'out' with God and the struggle to 'get right' with Him, in other words the need for salvation and the elaboration of means for attaining it. As religion develops, the nature of the salvation desired is more clearly conceived, and the possibility of attaining it becomes more assured. There are thus four aspects—the need of Salvation, the possibility or assurance of Salvation, the nature of Salvation and the means of Salvation—under which every religion can be studied and estimated, and this principle of division Dr. Shaw uses.

In the survey he undertakes the author discovers two main types of developed religion, Religions of Discovery, Knowledge and Enlightenment, and Religions of Revelation, Personal Relationship and Salvation, the former arising from an Aryan and the latter from a Semitic source. These correspond to the philosophic and the prophetic types of mind, each of which has something of value to contribute to the discovery of spiritual truth. Dr. Shaw does not attempt to construct a hierarchy of religions, and even the supremacy of Christianity is only hypothetical, being conditional on its not being superseded by deeper insight into the nature of reality which the race may yet gain. Meanwhile it holds the field as combining the advantages of both types.

In spite of his lucid style, Dr. Shaw's compression of so much material into some 170 pages—of which Confucianism gets eight and Christianity twenty-three—makes heavy demands on the reader, but an excellent analysis of the argument in the Table of Contents provides welcome guide-posts.

G. K. MacBean.

THE PSYCHOLOGIST IN THE WITNESS-BOX.

Many books giving an exposition of the principles of psychology have maintained either a slight contempt for religious convictions as out of date or a significant silence which, for some at any rate, has spoken louder than words. But in these lectures,† Dr. Yellowlees makes a valuable contribution by co-ordinating the principles of religion and psychology. As he says somewhere, 'Only a religious man *can* understand religion': and that this book is so helpful is perhaps due in the first place to the fact that it is written by a religious doctor who is also a psychologist. The lectures which were first given to students at Swanwick, take some knowledge for granted: but they offer some clear and illustrative teaching on many of the half-understood terms of psychology — repression, suggestion, sublimation, etc.—and a useful analysis of the theories of Freud and Jung.

Also, we note two points of special interest. One is the critical and rather severe attitude of Dr. Yellowlees towards modern 'faith-healing.' While he favours a closer co-operation between priest and doctor, he rightly stresses the dangers which arise when clergymen try to meddle with cases properly in the domain of the doctor. 'I believe,' he says, 'that God does heal disease . . . but I do not believe that any one method or any one case of recovery is more specially "spiritual" than any other. And I find it a

* *Enlightenment and Salvation.* By R. D. M. Shaw, D.D. (Williams and Norgate. 1930. 7/6.)

† *Psychology's Defence of the Faith.* By David Yellowlees, M.B., Ch.B. (S.C.M. 5/-.)

ossible to believe that God would, or could, disperse a tumour or destroy infection by a mere *fiat,* as to believe that it was in that way He ted the heaven and the earth' (p. 174).

And he has some severe remarks on the 'lumber room of the Church,' ch, he insists, must be cleared up if ever the Church is going to wel- e psychology. He instances the need for ministers to overhaul 'not much what they themselves believe, but what is actually being taught, licitly or implicitly, to children in homes and Sunday Schools,' and thus ecure that the background and furniture of religion are psychologically nd. 'No surgeon will willingly operate in a theatre with cobwebs on walls. But there are some cobwebs on the walls of the Church.'

Dr. Yellowlees is so eager to give his message that sometimes he leaves entence unfinished in order to go on to the next. But, in spite of one wo grammatical blemishes, this is a stimulating study in religion and chology, and it will be of great help to many. J.P.H.

THE STUDY OF THE GOSPELS.*

People will not understand the Gospels in the modern way until they erstand how they were written and their relation to each other. The v. R. Gladstone Griffith has treated this and much more than this in a mpact little book of 155 pages. The book is scholarly, conscientious, tious, and thoroughly honest. Mr. Griffith does not avoid difficult ques- ns or give ambiguous answers to them. This does not mean that the hor's tone suggests that his answer is necessarily the right one, nor s it mean that we are always able to agree with it.

Anyone who will use this book as it is intended to be used will get a t-class knowledge of the Gospels and of the many problems which their dy involves. Each of the twenty chapters concludes with a set of ques- ns for discussion. Francis Bacon has said: 'A wise question is half its swer.' Those who read these questions will recognize in many cases h their suggestiveness and originality.

This is an excellent book for those who wish to conduct a class or study- cle on the Gospels, and it is equally valuable for private study. We hope t it may be widely used. H.D.A.M.

A BOOK FOR PARENTS AND CHILDREN.

In Him was Life† seeks to tell young children the story of creation as a odern-minded Christian understands it. To do this successfully is extra- dinarily difficult, as perhaps those only know who have attempted it. We ve for long felt that a woman could do it better than a man. Elnith van's book is the justification of our view. It is the best that we have me across for its purpose. The authoress has poetic power and a gift of le.

The Bishop of Croydon writes in the Foreword: 'I believe this book ll be a real help to those who, however reasonably sure they may be that in Christ was (and *is*) life," are nevertheless hard put to it to explain d interpret this belief to children, whether their own or others . . . The cret of Christianity's power, so some of us are convinced, is not merely cause it makes bad people good, but also because it does, in a truly tisfying way, "make sense" of the whole scheme. There is no reason

* *The Gospel History Examined.* By Rev. R. Gladstone Griffith, M.A. (Pub. Orping- n Press, High Street, Orpington: 1930. Price 2/6, cloth boards 3/6, postage 3d. extra.)

† *In Him was Life.* By Elnith Bevan. (Pub. S.P.C.K., 1930. Price 1/6, cloth; -, paper.)

why even small children should not begin to understand that God, the God who is like Jesus, has to do not only with "Church" and "religious" things, but with everything . . . ' This admirable book contains a short bibliography for parents. H.D.A.M.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE MODERN CHURCHMEN'S UNION COUNCIL ELECTION, 1931.

To the Editor of *The Modern Churchman.*

SIR,

I shall be obliged if you will kindly give publicity to the following official notice to members of the Modern Churchmen's Union.

By the Constitution the following elected members of the Council retire on the day of the Annual General Meeting (May 20th, 1931), and are *not eligible for re-election,* viz., Miss A. M. Ferguson, Rev. R. G. Griffith, Dr. P. J. Kirkby, Dr. W. D. Morrison, Canon Raven, Rev. A. E. N. Simms, Rev. J. S. Boys-Smith, Rev. A. H. Streeten, Miss Dorothy Ward.

The following co-opted members of the Council retire on May 20th, but *are eligible for re-election,* viz., Rev. K. G. Budd, Miss E. M. Beaumont, Rev. A. T. W. Dowding, Rev. R. D. Richardson, Canon R. B. Tollinton, Dr. J. W. Walker, Dr. Douglas White.

All other members of the Council (whose names are printed on the cover of the *Modern Churchman*) continue to serve.

Ten members of the Council are to be elected this year, and nominations of candidates must reach the Secretary not later than March 1st. The names must be proposed and seconded by members of the Union. If more than ten nominations are received, voting papers will be sent to all members of the Union.

T. J. WOOD.

MODERNIST TEXT-BOOKS.

SIR,

We are frequently being asked whether the Modern Churchmen's Union has any list of suitable books to recommend on various subjects, and one of these is the teaching of the young. The recent discussion in your columns on this matter indicates that the present is a convenient opportunity for the drawing up of lists of recommended books, and I shall be very glad to enlist the help of your readers. I shall therefore be very grateful to receive suggestions for lists of books on the following subjects :—

(1) The religious education of the very young.
(2) Subjects and methods for Sunday School teaching.
(3) Teaching of adolescents and Confirmation candidates.
(4) Introductory books on the modern outlook in Biblical and doctrinal teaching for adults.
(5) Books showing the present position in Biblical and theological study, suitable for students.
(6) The history and principles of Modernism.

It would be of great convenience if those who send lists would kindly indicate the precise value and use of the books they include. When complete, the lists will be available for all members of the Modern Churchmen's Union and for others who enquire.

T. J. WOOD.

Modern Churchmen's Union Office,
Church House, Westminster, S.W.1.